The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study
Abstract
This article reports the findings of a series of experiments on committee decision making under majority rule. The committee members had relatively fixed preferences, so that the process was one of making decisions rather than one of problem solving. The predictions of a variety of models drawn from Economics, Sociology, Political Science and Game Theory were compared to the experimental results. One predictive concept, the core of the noncooperative game without side payments (equivalent to the majority rule equilibrium) consistently performed best. Significantly, however, even when such an outcome did not exist, the experimental results did not display the degree of unpredictability that some theoretical work would suggest. An important subsidiary finding concerns the difference between experiments conducted under conditions of high stakes versus those conducted under conditions of much lower stakes. The findings in the two conditions differed considerably, thus calling into question the political applicability of numerous social psychological experiments in which subjects had little or no motivation.
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Cites
Schelling, T. C. (1960) · Cited by 7,672
The Theory of Political Coalitions
Brazil, B. R., & Riker, W. S. (1963) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/445870 · Cited by 2,106
The Theory of Political Coalitions.
Hotz, A. J., & Riker, W. H. (1963) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109034 · Cited by 1,528
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
McKelvey, R. D. (1976) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(76)90040-5 · Cited by 1,339
Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. (1965) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.20269 · Cited by 1,294
A theory of coalition formation
Gamson, W. A. (1961) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2090664 · Cited by 1,070
An Introduction to Positive Political Theory
Riker, W. H., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1973) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 972
Rapoport, A. (1965) · Cited by 946
A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule
Plott, C. R. (1967) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · Cited by 919
Self-citationFishburn, P. C. (2015) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400868339 · Cited by 700
Cited by
The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework
Camerer, C. F., Hogarth, R. M., Budescu, D. V., & Eckel, C. (1999) · Elicitation of Preferences · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1406-8_2 · Cited by 1,545
MONETARY REWARDS AND DECISION COST IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
SMITH, V. L., & WALKER, J. M. (1993) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1993.tb00881.x · Cited by 560
The Psychology of Group Conflict and the Dynamics of Oppression: A Social Dominance Perspective
Sidanius, J. (1993) · Explorations in Political Psychology · doi:10.1215/9780822396697-009 · Cited by 365
E XPERIMENTAL M ETHODS IN P OLITICAL S CIENCE
McDermott, R. (2002) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.091001.170657 · Cited by 285
A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game
Cason, T. N., & Mui, V. (1997) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00233 · Cited by 255
Metadata
- Authors
- Fiorina, M. P., & Plott, C. R.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1978-06
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 575-598
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2083307720
- Cited by
- 391
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 28.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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