The DOI matches its OpenAlex record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game
Abstract
This paper introduces the team dictator game to study whether social dynamics within a group can cause groups’ decisions to differ systematically from individuals’ decisions. In the individual dictator game, a subject dictates the allocation of y dollars; in the team dictator game, a team of two subjects dictates the allocation of 2y dollars. We derive and test competing predictions for the two dominant psychological theories of group polarisation in this context. The data indicate that team choices tend to be dominated by the more other‐regarding member. This result is more consistent with Social Comparison Theory than Persuasive Argument Theory.
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Cites
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Cited by
Gender Differences in Preferences
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.2.448 · Cited by 5,694
Which is the fair sex? Gender differences in altruism.
Andreoni, J., & Vesterlund, L. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355301556419 · Cited by 1,427
Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation Decisions
Konow, J. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.1072 · Cited by 887
Are Two Heads Better Than One? Monetary Policy by Committee
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Minimal social cues in the dictator game
Rigdon, M., Ishii, K., Watabe, M., & Kitayama, S. (2009) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2009.02.002 · Cited by 302
Metadata
- Authors
- Cason, T. N., & Mui, V.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 1997-09-01
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 444
- Pages
- 1465-1483
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2136878723
- Cited by
- 255
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 3.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
