The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government
Abstract
Some recent theories have blamed the growth of government on budget-maximizing bureaucrats who are assumedly capable of imposing their most preferred budget-output combination on legislatures, subject to cost and demand constraints. However, theoretical examination of the range of bargaining outcomes that might occur between bureau and legislature shows that budget-maximizing behavior does not necessarily lead to super-optimal levels of production, nor do the suggested reforms of competition and privatization necessarily improve the situation. In this bargaining model, the central determinants of governmental growth are not budget-maximizing bureaucrats, but the legislature's decisions regarding mode of oversight and form of internal organization.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations
Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081899551048 · Cited by 2,113
The New Economics of Organization
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Self-citationThe Political Economy of Federalism
Chubb, J. E. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956245 · Cited by 1,444
Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6536 · Cited by 910
Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?
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Metadata
- Authors
- Miller, G. J., & Moe, T. M.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1983-06
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 297-322
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2037382985
- Cited by
- 260
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 54.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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