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Cited by 666

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms

Weingast, Barry R.·1979·American Journal of Political Science
DOI 10.2307/2111001
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Abstract

This paper begins with a contrast between the conclusions of theoretical and empirical work on distributive policy-making. The former predicts that a minimum winning coalition will make public policy; the latter reveals universal or unanimous coalitions. This paper presents a model whose predictions conform to empirical findings. It first defines a "Distributive Legislative Game" and then shows that the set of minimum winning coalitions is the core of the game. To explain the observation of unanimous coalitions, it is shown that another game, the "Universalism Legislative Game," which allows only the coalition of the whole, dominates the previous game in the sense that the ex ante expected benefits are higher for all legislators. The observed "norm" of universal coalitions in Congress is thus interpreted as legislators choosing the rules of the game to maximize their expected benefits.

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Cites

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Metadata

Authors
Weingast, B. R.
Venue
American Journal of Political Science
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1979-05
Volume
23
Issue
2
Pages
245
ISSN
0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/2111001
OpenAlex
W1864519938
Cited by
666
References
9
FWCI
17.46
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2111001
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Weingast, B. R. (1979). A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111001

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.