The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade
Abstract
Recent literature typically attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner's dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade. I argue that the prisoner's dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system: security externalities. Explicit consideration of these effects suggests that a bipolar international political system has an advantage relative to its multipolar counterpart with respect to the opening of markets among states. Less credible exit threats and stronger incentives to engage in altruism within its alliances explain the advantage of a two-power system.
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Citations
Cites
Becker, G. S. (1991) · doi:10.4159/9780674020665 · Cited by 10,565
Cooperation under the security dilemma
Jervis, R. (1978) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2009958 · Cited by 2,305
Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation
Johnson, H. G. (1953) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296006 · Cited by 666
Cited by
Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics
Moravcsik, A. (1997) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081897550447 · Cited by 2,814
Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion
Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec_a_00351 · Cited by 1,879
Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution
Ruggie, J. G. (1992) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027831 · Cited by 1,163
The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise
Layne, C. (1993) · International Security · doi:10.2307/2539020 · Cited by 777
Legro, J. W., & Moravcsik, A. (1999) · International Security · doi:10.1162/016228899560130 · Cited by 725
Metadata
- Authors
- Gowa, J.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1989-12-01
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1245-1256
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2117581937
- Cited by
- 190
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 43.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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