The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court
Abstract
Participation as amicus curiae has long been an important tactic of organized interests in litigation before the U.S. Supreme Court. We analyze amicus curiae briefs filed before the decision on certiorari and assess their impact on the Court's selection of a plenary docket. We hypothesize that one or more briefs advocating or opposing certiorari increase the likelihood of its being granted. We test this hypothesis using data from the United States Reports and Briefs and Records of the United States Supreme Court for the 1982 term. The statistical analysis demonstrates that the presence of amicus curiae briefs filed prior to the decision on certiorari significantly and positively increases the chances of the justices' binding of a case over for full treatment—even after we take into account the full array of variables other scholars have hypothesized or shown to be substantial influences on the decision to grant or deny.
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Cites
Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics
Maddala, G. S. (1983) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511810176 · Cited by 13,240
Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change
Galanter, M. (1974) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.2307/3053023 · Cited by 2,799
The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America
Walker, J. L. (1983) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1958924 · Cited by 607
Hansen, J. M. (1986) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400185405 · Cited by 590
(2005) · The Supreme Court in the American Legal System · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614705.013 · Cited by 455
The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures
Bentley, A. F., & Lavine, T. Z. (2017) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315134222 · Cited by 453
Amici Curiae before the Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?
Caldeira, G. A., & Wright, J. R. (1990) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2131827 · Cited by 196
Self-citationThe Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy
Krislov, S. (1963) · The Yale Law Journal · doi:10.2307/794698 · Cited by 148
Stricko, T. W., & Bonneau, C. W. (2011) · International Encyclopedia of Political Science · doi:10.4135/9781412959636.n311 · Cited by 80
The Rise of Conservative Interest Group Litigation
O’Connor, K., & Epstein, L. (1983) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2130136 · Cited by 64
Cited by
The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes
Sears, D. O., & Funk, C. L. (1991) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60327-5 · Cited by 612
Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review
Vanberg, G. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669345 · Cited by 364
Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence
Potters, J., & Sloof, R. (1996) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/s0176-2680(96)00008-0 · Cited by 298
Cameron, C. M., Segal, J. A., & Songer, D. (2000) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586383 · Cited by 262
Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction
Rogers, J. R. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669361 · Cited by 257
Metadata
- Authors
- Caldeira, G. A., & Wright, J. R.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1988-12
- Volume
- 82
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1109-1127
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2158829500
- Cited by
- 439
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 94.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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