The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction
Abstract
This article develops a simple signaling game in which a Legislature and a Court interact in seeking their own policy goals. The Legislature faces two sources of uncertainty when legislating. First, it knows only probabilistically whether Court's preferences converge or diverge from its own on proposed law. Second, its knows only probabilistically true state of world and, hence, does not know with certainty whether law will reasonably achieve its intended outcome if enacted. For institutional and sequential reasons, Court has more information regarding actual consequences of an enacted law than Legislature did when initially considering it. As a result, Court's exercise of judicial veto may (but not necessarily will) be informationally productive. The possibility of informative judicial review affects quantity and informational quality of legislation enacted by Legislature relative to legislation that would be enacted in absence of judicial review. Further, an informational component to judicial review alters incentive that Court has to act strategically relative to incentives for strategic behavior in purely distributive models of legislative-judicial interaction. Finally, because of possibility of informative judicial review, model accounts endogenously for creation and maintenance of an independent judiciary by a Legislature that solelyvalues achieving its preferred policy outcomes. a A Then considering a proposed bill, legislators face uncertainty regarding outcome they want bill to achieve and outcome that law actually will have when implemented and enforced (Krehbiel 1991, 62). Legislative decision making thus requires prediction as legislators look forward to anticipate impact a proposal might have if enacted. contrast, judicial policy-makers tend to be more backward looking. They review laws in light of their realized consequences. This difference critically distinguishes informational context of legislative decisions from informational context of judicial decisions. As Felix Frankfurter noted, In availability of which underlie litigation, there is a wide gulf between opinions in advance of legislation ... and decisions in litigation after such proposals are embodied into law or carried into execution (1930, 478). As a result, in the crucial cases, differing judgments of legislature and court over policy resolve ... not really to a difference about law, but to differences in knowledge of relevant and inferences drawn from such facts (Frankfurter 1924, 1004). Yet judiciary's distinctive informational role in policy process and how it influences judicial and legislative behavior has attracted little systematic attention from political scholars.' This article builds upon earlier preference-based models of legislative-judicial interaction by recognizing informational component of judicial review and incorporating it in a game-theoretic model along with assumption that Court is a policy-motivated actor.2 Adding an infor-
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Information and Legislative Organization
Krehbiel, K. (1991) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.8850 · Cited by 1,718
McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · Virginia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1073179 · Cited by 1,207
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
Spaeth, H. J., & Segal, J. A. (1993) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 996
Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6536 · Cited by 910
The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information
Hirshleifer, J., & Riley, J. G. (1992) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139167635 · Cited by 842
Epstein, L., & Knight, D. J. (1997) · Cited by 736
(1987) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036932 · Cited by 638
Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court
Caldeira, G. A., & Wright, J. R. (1988) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961752 · Cited by 439
Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature
Gilligan, T. W., & Krehbiel, K. (1990) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111460 · Cited by 395
Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power
Rosenberg, G. N. (1992) · The Review of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0034670500018222 · Cited by 186
Cited by
The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany
Vanberg, G. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510427 · Cited by 528
Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation
Powell, E. J., & Staton, J. K. (2009) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.01527.x · Cited by 371
Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review
Vanberg, G. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669345 · Cited by 364
The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy
Clark, T. S. (2009) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00411.x · Cited by 320
WHITTINGTON, K. E. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051890 · Cited by 285
Metadata
- Authors
- Rogers, J. R.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2001-01
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 84
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2322960473
- Cited by
- 257
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 286.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2669361
- The paper
- Rogers, J. R. (2001). Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669361
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.