The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 65 of the 68 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I use basic tools of economic theory to construct a simple model of the behavior of dictatorships. Two extreme cases are considered: a “tin-pot” dictatorship, in which the dictator wishes only to minimize the costs of remaining in power in order to collect the fruits of office (palaces, Mercedes-Benzes, Swiss bank accounts), and a “totalitarian” dictatorship, whose leader maximizes power over the population. I show that the two differ in their responses to economic change. For example, a decline in economic performance will lead a tin-pot regime to increase its repression of the population, whereas it will lead a totalitarian government to reduce repression. The model also shows why military dictatorships (a subspecies of tin-pots) tend to be short-lived and often voluntarily hand power over to a civilian regime; explains numerous features of totalitarian regimes; and suggests what policies will enable democratic regimes to deal with dictatorships effectively.
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“Second, the shift from mass to targeted and less visible repression is shown by how online smear campaigns reinforce judicial harassment,72”
From The rise of authoritarian informationalism: escalating surveillance, manipulation, and control (2026) · cites this paper as [72]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Wintrobe, R.
- Affiliations
- Western University (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Wintrobe, Ronald
- ORCID
- Wintrobe, Ronald
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1990-09
- Volume
- 84
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 849-872
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W1988287638
- Cited by
- 430
- References
- 68
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 27 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 50 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 19 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 20 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 32
- FWCI
- 22.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Natural Resources and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Keywords
- dictatorship, totalitarian regimes, repression, military dictatorship, regime survival, democratic transition
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