The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship
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Abstract
I use basic tools of economic theory to construct a simple model of the behavior of dictatorships. Two extreme cases are considered: a “tin-pot” dictatorship, in which the dictator wishes only to minimize the costs of remaining in power in order to collect the fruits of office (palaces, Mercedes-Benzes, Swiss bank accounts), and a “totalitarian” dictatorship, whose leader maximizes power over the population. I show that the two differ in their responses to economic change. For example, a decline in economic performance will lead a tin-pot regime to increase its repression of the population, whereas it will lead a totalitarian government to reduce repression. The model also shows why military dictatorships (a subspecies of tin-pots) tend to be short-lived and often voluntarily hand power over to a civilian regime; explains numerous features of totalitarian regimes; and suggests what policies will enable democratic regimes to deal with dictatorships effectively.
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“Second, the shift from mass to targeted and less visible repression is shown by how online smear campaigns reinforce judicial harassment,72”
From The rise of authoritarian informationalism: escalating surveillance, manipulation, and control (2026) · cites this paper as [72]
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“Figure 2 describes the simple version of that model (Wintrobe (1990).”
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Kontorovich, V., & Wein, A. (2009) · Europe Asia Studies · doi:10.1080/09668130903209145 · Cited by 30
“Here economic growth generates consumer goods to buy supporters’ loyalty and maintain the apparatus of repression (Wintrobe 1990, p. 866).”
BackgroundUnderstanding and Avoiding the Oil Curse in Resource-rich Arab Economies
Elbadawi, I. A., & Selim, H. (2016) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781316493854 · Cited by 34
Political Efficiency and Equal Protection of the Law
Congleton, R. D. (1997) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/1467-6435.00027 · Cited by 29
Zhao, Y., Umair, M., Gulzar, F., Guliyeva, S., & Xabibullayev, D. (2025) · Ecological Indicators · doi:10.1016/j.ecolind.2025.113658 · Cited by 35
Metadata
- Authors
- Wintrobe, R.
- Affiliations
- Western University (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Wintrobe, Ronald
- ORCID
- Wintrobe, Ronald
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1990-09
- Volume
- 84
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 849-872
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W1988287638
- Cited by
- 430
- References
- 68
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 27 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 50 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 19 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 20 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 32
- FWCI
- 22.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Natural Resources and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Keywords
- dictatorship, totalitarian regimes, repression, military dictatorship, regime survival, democratic transition
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.