The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance
Abstract
Governments of the Left and Right have distinct partisan economic policies and objectives that they would prefer to pursue. Their propensity to do so, however, is constrained by their desire for reelection. We argue that the ability of governments to further their partisan interests and preside over reelectable macroeconomic outcomes simultaneously is dependent on the organization of the domestic economy, particularly the labor movement. We hypothesize that there are two different paths to desirable macroeconomic performance. In countries with densely and centrally organized labor movements, leftist governments can promote economic growth and reduce inflation and unemployment. Conversely, in countries with weak labor movements, rightist governments can pursue their partisan-preferred macroeconomic strategies and achieve similarly beneficial macroeconomic outcomes. Performance will be poorer in other cases. These hypotheses are supported by analysis of pooled annual time series data for 16 advanced industrial democracies between 1967 and 1984.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,594
Hsiao, C. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139839327 · Cited by 7,869
Hsiao, C. (2022) · doi:10.1017/9781009057745 · Cited by 7,869
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Hibbs, D. A. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400269712 · Cited by 3,368
Elements of Econometrics: Second Edition
Kmenta, J. (1997) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.15701 · Cited by 3,221
The Rise and Decline of Nations.
Beckerman, W., & Olson, M. (1983) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232759 · Cited by 2,792
Katz, R. S. (1982) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961197 · Cited by 2,468
Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance
Calmfors, L., Driffill, J., Honkapohja, S., & Giavazzi, F. (1988) · Economic Policy · doi:10.2307/1344503 · Cited by 2,360
Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Econometrics
Ziegel, E. (1989) · Technometrics · doi:10.1080/00401706.1989.10488621 · Cited by 2,239
Wickens, M. R., & Kmenta, J. (1972) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2552662 · Cited by 1,382
Cited by
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082979 · Cited by 6,840
Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies
Esping-Andersen, G. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0198742002.001.0001 · Cited by 6,253
An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism
(2001) · Varieties of Capitalism · doi:10.1093/0199247757.003.0001 · Cited by 3,083
Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State
Estevez‐Abe, M., Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2001) · Varieties of Capitalism · doi:10.1093/0199247757.003.0004 · Cited by 1,568
Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India
Besley, T., & Burgess, R. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355304772839533 · Cited by 1,394
Hall, P. A., & Gingerich, D. W. (2009) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123409000672 · Cited by 1,113
When parties matter: A review of the possibilities and limits of partisan influence on public policy
Schmidt, M. G. (1996) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.1996.tb00673.x · Cited by 981
Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis
Poe, S. C., & Tate, C. N. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082712 · Cited by 934
T IME-S ERIES–C ROSS-S ECTION D ATA: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years?
Beck, N. (2001) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.271 · Cited by 916
Insider–Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social Democratic Parties
RUEDA, D. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305540505149x · Cited by 776
Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960–82
Hicks, A. M., & Swank, D. H. (1992) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1964129 · Cited by 734
Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union
Hall, P. A., & Franzese, R. J. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550644 · Cited by 685
Europeans and the European Community: the dynamics of public support for European integration
Eichenberg, R. C., & Dalton, R. J. (1993) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300028083 · Cited by 655
Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism
Rueda, D., & Pontusson, J. (2000) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887100016579 · Cited by 566
Traxler, F., Blaschke, S., & Kittel, B. (2001) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295549.001.0001 · Cited by 523
Burstein, P., & Linton, A. (2002) · Social Forces · doi:10.1353/sof.2003.0004 · Cited by 509
Capital mobility, trade, and the domestic politics of economic policy
Garrett, G. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300028472 · Cited by 504
Self-citationOn The So-Called “Huber Sandwich Estimator” and “Robust Standard Errors”
Freedman, D. A. (2006) · The American Statistician · doi:10.1198/000313006x152207 · Cited by 498
Political responses to interdependence: what's “left” for the left?
Garrett, G., & Lange, P. (1991) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033208 · Cited by 473
Self-citationThe Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization
Quinn, D. P., & Inclan, C. (1997) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111675 · Cited by 428
E LECTORAL AND P ARTISAN C YCLES IN E CONOMIC P OLICIES AND O UTCOMES
Franzese, R. J. (2002) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.112801.080924 · Cited by 416
The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital
Baum, M. A., & Lake, D. A. (2003) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/1540-5907.00023 · Cited by 415
Partisan Governance, Women's Employment, and the Social Democratic Service State
Huber, E., & Stephens, J. D. (2000) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/000312240006500301 · Cited by 383
Vice into Virtue? Progressive Politics and Welfare Reform in Continental Europe
LEVY, J. D. (1999) · Politics & Society · doi:10.1177/0032329299027002004 · Cited by 371
Varieties of Labor Politics in the Developed Democracies
Thelen, K. (2001) · Varieties of Capitalism · doi:10.1093/0199247757.003.0002 · Cited by 344
Voter ideology in western democracies, 1946–1989
Kim, H., & Fording, R. C. (1998) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1023/a:1006882806861 · Cited by 323
Cooperation and Political Economic Performance in Affluent Democratic Capitalism
Hicks, A., & Kenworthy, L. (1998) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/231403 · Cited by 316
Keith, L. C. (1999) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343399036001006 · Cited by 308
Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence, and the Real Effects of Money
Iversen, T. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550635 · Cited by 305
Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy?
Milner, H. V., & Judkins, B. (2004) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00293.x · Cited by 304
Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the UK
Vitols, S. (2001) · Varieties of Capitalism · doi:10.1093/0199247757.003.0010 · Cited by 268
Bayesian Inference for Comparative Research
Western, B., & Jackman, S. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2944713 · Cited by 257
Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Clark, W. R., & Hallerberg, M. (2000) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586015 · Cited by 252
The Political Economy of Imprisonment in Affluent Western Democracies, 1960–1990
Sutton, J. R. (2004) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/000312240406900202 · Cited by 213
Labor Organization and Electoral Participation in Industrial Democracies
Radcliff, B., & Davis, P. (2000) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669299 · Cited by 207
Metadata
- Authors
- Alvarez, R. M., Garrett, G., & Lange, P.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991-06
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 539-556
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2087166361
- Cited by
- 465
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 28.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.