The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political Solutions to Market Problems
Abstract
For some, market failures serve as a rationale for public intervention. However, the fact that self-interested market behavior does not always produce felicitous social consequences is not sufficient reason to draw this conclusion. It is necessary to assess public performance under comparable conditions, and hence to analyze self-interested political behavior in the institutional structures of the public sector. Our approach emphasizes this institutional structure—warts and all—and thereby provides specific cautionary warnings about optimistic reliance on political institutions to improve upon market performance.
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Citations
Cites
The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure
Samuelson, P. A. (1954) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1925895 · Cited by 7,458
Cited by
What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading
Stavins, R. N. (1998) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.12.3.69 · Cited by 725
Getting the Job Done: Alternative Policy Instruments
McDonnell, L. M., & Elmore, R. F. (1987) · Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis · doi:10.2307/1163726 · Cited by 660
The Attractiveness of Political Markets: Implications for Firm Strategy
Bonardi, J.-P., Hillman, A. J., & Keim, G. D. (2005) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2005.16387895 · Cited by 515
Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature
Gilligan, T. W., & Krehbiel, K. (1990) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111460 · Cited by 395
The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure
McCubbins, M. D. (1985) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111178 · Cited by 388
Metadata
- Authors
- Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1984-06
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 417-434
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2316333458
- Cited by
- 189
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 19.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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