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Cited by 395

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature

Gilligan, Thomas W., Krehbiel, Keith·1990·American Journal of Political Science
DOI 10.2307/2111460
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Abstract

This paper combines an organization theory perspective with rational choice techniques to study legislative design. The specific focus is on how a legislature assigns members and transfers resources to standing committees with the aim of motivating committees to specialize and to share the benefits of specialization. The stimulus for the study comes from organization theory and a long tradition of empirical congressional studies. The main analytical tool, however, is a game of incomplete information. Several testable propositions about legislative organization are derived.

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Metadata

Authors
Gilligan, T. W., & Krehbiel, K.
Venue
American Journal of Political Science
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1990-05
Volume
34
Issue
2
Pages
531
ISSN
0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/2111460
OpenAlex
W2030197407
Cited by
395
References
2
FWCI
15.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2111460
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Gilligan, T. W., & Krehbiel, K. (1990). Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111460

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.