The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?
Abstract
A diverse set of congressional studies portrays members of standing committees as more or less homogeneous “high demanders” or “preference outliers” relative to members of the larger legislature. Using interest group ratings of members of the Ninety-sixth to Ninety-ninth Congresses, I conduct conventional statistical hypothesis tests to discern whether standing committees are more extreme and more homogeneous than the legislature as a whole. With only a few exceptions, the tests do not allow confident rejection of null hypotheses of identical committee and chamber preferences. The absence of convincing evidence of preference outliers is broadly consistent with emerging incomplete information game-theoretic legislative research and difficult to reconcile with many previous formal theories of legislative politics.
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Citations
Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Krehbiel, K.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1990-03
- Volume
- 84
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 149-163
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2003326520
- Cited by
- 283
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 66.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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