The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Rationality, Morality, and Exit
Abstract
The morality and rationality issue is explored from an Axelrod-type perspective; that is, it is discussed in terms of recurrent-prisoner's-dilemma-type games and behavioral strategies or programs for playing them. We argue that intuitive notions of rationality and morality can be shown to be mutually compatible if two assumptions are made: (1) that morality is specified as a general behavioral disposition or program whose rationality is to be determined in comparison to alternative behavioral programs and (2) that the recurrent game is specified as a prisoner's dilemma game with an exit option. The results of a simulation experiment are presented, showing that a “moral program” (specified as one that never defects, but exits in response to an opponents defection) is successful in competition with a variety of alternative programs, including Tit for Tat.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation
Kollock, P. (1998) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.183 · Cited by 1,746
The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust
Kollock, P. (1994) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/230539 · Cited by 946
Uncertainty, Trust, and Commitment Formation in the United States and Japan
Yamagishi, T., Cook, K. S., & Watabe, M. (1998) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/210005 · Cited by 726
Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially for humans
Barclay, P. (2013) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.02.002 · Cited by 339
Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
Ghosh, P., & Ray, D. (1996) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297892 · Cited by 316
Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
Aktipis, C. A. (2004) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.06.020 · Cited by 298
The Emergence of Generalized Exchange
Takahashi, N. (2000) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/210400 · Cited by 290
Social Welfare, Cooperators' Advantage, and the Option of Not Playing the Game
Orbell, J. M., & Dawes, R. M. (1993) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2095951 · Cited by 284
Physical Attractiveness, Opportunity, and Success in Everyday Exchange
Mulford, M., Orbell, J., Shatto, C., & Stockard, J. (1998) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/231401 · Cited by 253
Partner choice versus punishment in human Prisoner’s Dilemmas
Barclay, P., & Raihani, N. (2016) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.12.004 · Cited by 67
“…(e.g. Aktipis, 2004, 2011; Hayashi & Yamagishi, 1998; Enquist & Leimar, 1993; McNamara, Barta, Frohmage, & Houston, 2008; Sherratt & Roberts, 1998; Vanberg & Congleton, 1992), reduce their investment in relationships with poor cooperators (e.g. Barclay, 2011; Bull & Rice, 1991; Kiers et al.,…”
Metadata
- Authors
- Vanberg, V. J., & Congleton, R. D.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1992-06
- Volume
- 86
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 418-431
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2329230190
- Cited by
- 230
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 34.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.