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Cited by 284

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Social Welfare, Cooperators' Advantage, and the Option of Not Playing the Game

Orbell, John M., Dawes, Robyn M.·1993·American Sociological Review

Abstract

The AA. outline a model of how freedom to choose between playing and not playing particular Pisoner's dilemma games can (1) increase social welfare and (2) provide relative gains to intending cooperators. When cooperators are relatively more willing to play, they will interact more frequently with each other and their pay off per encounter will be higher - potentially higher than that of intending defectors. The AA. speculate about the cognitive processes that underlie this result.

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Metadata

Authors
Orbell, J. M., & Dawes, R. M.
Venue
American Sociological Review
Published
1993-12
Volume
58
Issue
6
Pages
787
ISSN
0003-1224 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2039319824
Cited by
284
References
23
FWCI
29.94
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Social Welfare, Cooperators' Advantage, and the Option of Not Playing the Game. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2095951
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Orbell, J. M., & Dawes, R. M. (1993). Social Welfare, Cooperators' Advantage, and the Option of Not Playing the Game. American Sociological Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095951

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.