The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter
Abstract
Deterrence theories purport to supply the auxiliary assumptions rational choice theories need to predict rational strategic behavior. They generally assume that would-be initiators are (i) instrumentally rational; (2) risk-prone gain-maximizers; (3) free of domestic constraints; and (4) able to identify themselves correctly as defenders or challengers. These assumptions are contradicted by empirical studies that indicate that risk-prone, gain-maximizing initiators are relatively uncommon; that leaders at times calculate as deterrence theories expect, but behave contrary to their predictions; and that the calculus of initiators generally depends on factors other than those identified by deterrence theories. Deductive theories of deterrence are also inadequate because they do not define their scope conditions. Nor can they accommodate deviation by initiators from processes of rational calculation. Rational deterrence theories are poorly specified theories about nonexistent decision makers operating in nonexistent environments.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,594
Allen, C. L., & Friedman, M. (1954) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1053873 · Cited by 3,204
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
Jervis, R. (2017) · doi:10.1515/9781400885114 · Cited by 3,199
Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method
Lijphart, A. (1971) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1955513 · Cited by 3,151
Hutchison, T. W., & Friedman, M. (1954) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2228046 · Cited by 2,999
Greenstein, F. I., & Polsby, N. W. (1975) · Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc. eBooks · Cited by 2,305
The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies
Ragin, C. C. (2014) · doi:10.1525/9780520957350 · Cited by 2,130
The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limitations
Schoemaker, P. J. H. (2007) · Journal of Economic Literature · Cited by 1,426
Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science
Simon, H. A. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956650 · Cited by 1,359
II. The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research
Lijphart, A. (1975) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/001041407500800203 · Cited by 772
Cited by
Social Theory of International Politics
Wendt, A. (1999) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511612183 · Cited by 7,664
The Renaissance of Security Studies
Walt, S. M. (1991) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2600471 · Cited by 1,074
The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use
Tannenwald, N. (1999) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081899550959 · Cited by 782
The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis
Carlsnaes, W. (1992) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2600772 · Cited by 522
A cultural theory of international relations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.47-2254 · Cited by 379
Metadata
- Authors
- Lebow, R. N., & Stein, J. G.
- Venue
- World Politics
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 1989-01
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 208-224
- ISSN
- 0043-8871 (ISSN-L)
- 1086-3338
- OpenAlex
- W2116187373
- Cited by
- 265
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 39.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2010408
- The paper
- Lebow, R. N., & Stein, J. G. (1989). Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter. World Politics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010408
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.