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Cited by 782Nuclear Issues and DefenseInternational Relations and Foreign PolicyGlobal Peace and Security Dynamics

The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use

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Tannenwald, Nina·1999·International Organization
DOI 10.1162/002081899550959
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Abstract

We have recently witnessed the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only use of nuclear weapons in warfare. The non-use of nuclear weapons since then remains the single most important phenomenon of the nuclear age. Yet we still lack a full understanding of how this tradition arose and is maintained and of its prospects for the future. The widely cited explanation is deterrence, but this account is either wrong or incomplete. Although an element of sheer luck no doubt has played a part in this fortuitous outcome, this article argues that a normative element must be taken into account in explaining why nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. A normative prohibition on nuclear use has developed in the global system, which, although not (yet) a fully robust norm, has stigmatized nuclear weapons as unacceptable weapons of mass destruction. Without this normative stigma, there might have been more “use.” This article examines this phenomenon in the context of the nuclear experience of the United States.

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Authors
Tannenwald, N.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Tannenwald, Nina
Venue
International Organization
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
1999
Volume
53
Issue
3
Pages
433-468
ISSN
  • 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-5088
DOI
10.1162/002081899550959
OpenAlex
W2101255587
Cited by
782
References
112
Citations by year
2026: 28 · 2025: 156 · 2024: 42 · 2023: 61 · 2022: 54 · 2021: 47 · 2020: 48 · 2019: 40 · 2018: 28 · 2017: 24 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 15 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 17
FWCI
97.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 1684 d)
Locations
  • International Organization (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Funders
University of Cambridge
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Nuclear Issues and Defense
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Global Peace and Security Dynamics
Keywords
nuclear taboo, nuclear non-use, nuclear weapons, deterrence, stigma, US nuclear policy, nuclear ethics, weapons of mass destruction, international norms

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