A Causal Theory of Knowing
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
According to a causal theory of knowledge, a belief qualifies as knowledge only if the belief stands in an appropriate causal relation to the facts.
“According to a causal theory of knowledge, a belief qualifies as knowledge only if the belief stands in an appropriate causal relation to the facts.”
From EPISTEMOLOGY AND INFORMATION (2008) · cites this paper as Goldman (1967)
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Dretske, F. (2008) · Philosophy of Information · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-51726-5.50007-8 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
Justified True Belief + Diachronic Justification: A Contemporary Defence
Küçükuncular, A. (2025) · Philosophies · doi:10.3390/philosophies10060126 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
- Authors
- Goldman, A. I.
- Corresponding author
- Goldman, Alvin I.
- ORCID
- Goldman, Alvin I.
- Venue
- The Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1967-06-22
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 357
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W178384805
- Cited by
- 925
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 29 · 2025: 39 · 2024: 49 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 58 · 2019: 98 · 2018: 46 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 31 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 40
- FWCI
- 13.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Keywords
- causal theory of knowledge, epistemology, justification
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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