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Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person
Abstract
The aim of this essay is to assess the significance of W. V. Quine's indeterminacy thesis. If Quine is right, the thesis has vast ramifications for the philosophy of language and mind; if he is wrong, we ought to be able to say exactly how and why. Let us begin by stating the behaviorist assumptions from which Quine originally proceeds. For the sake of developing an empirical theory of meaning, he confines his analysis to correlations between external stimuli and dispositions to verbal behavior. In thus limiting the analysis, he does not claim to capture all the intuitions we have about the pretheoretical notion, but rather the “objective reality” that is left over if we strip away the confusions and incoherencies in the pretheoretical “meaning.” The point of the “behavioristic ersatz” is to give us a scientific, empirical account of the objective reality of meaning. On this view, the objective reality is simply a matter of being disposed to produce utterances in response to external stimuli. The stimuli are defined entirely in terms of patterns of stimulations of the nerve endings, and the responses entirely in terms of sounds and sound patterns that the speaker is disposed to emit. But we are not supposed to think that between the stimulus and the verbal response there are any mental entities. We are not supposed to think that there is any consciousness, intentionality, thoughts, or any internal “meanings” connecting the stimuli to the noises. There is just the pattern of stimulus and the pattern of learned response.
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Citations
Cited by
Searle, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5834.001.0001 · Cited by 3,595
Self-citationSubjective, Intersubjective, Objective: Philosophical Essays Volume 3
Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0198237537.001.0001 · Cited by 1,295
A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge
Davidson, D. (2001) · Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective · doi:10.1093/0198237537.003.0010 · Cited by 658
Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science
Searle, J. R. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00029587 · Cited by 490
Self-citationPriest, G. (2002) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199254057.001.0001 · Cited by 428
Metadata
- Authors
- Searle, J. R.
- Venue
- The Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1987-03
- Volume
- 84
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 123
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3026740750
- Cited by
- 294
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 110.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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