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The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion.
Abstract
1. The Belief in a Just World.- 2. The First Experiment: The Effect of Fortuitous Reward.- 3. The Second Experiment: Observers' Reactions to the Victim.- 4. The Third Experiment: The Martyred and Innocent Victims.- 5. Three Experiments That Assess the Effects of Sex and Educational Background of Observers, Experimenter and Observer Influence on One Another, and the Reactions of Informed and Nonimplicated Observers.- 6. Reactions to the Belief in a Just World Theory and Findings: The Nay-Sayers.- 7. Condemning the Victimized.- 8. The Assignment of Blame.- 9. The Response to Victimization: Extreme Tests of the Belief in a Just World.- 10. Who Believes in a Just World: Dimension or Style.- 11. Deserving versus Justice.- References.
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Cited by
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Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.102.1.4 · Cited by 6,682
Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339 · Cited by 4,904
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hamilton, V. L., & Lerner, M. J.
- Venue
- Contemporary Sociology
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1982-03
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 236
- ISSN
- 0094-3061 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2138325436
- Cited by
- 2,538
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 58.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Hamilton, V. L., & Lerner, M. J. (1982). The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion. Contemporary Sociology. https://doi.org/10.2307/2067083
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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