The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Property Rights and the Organization of Economic Activity by the State
Abstract
In advanced capitalist society the state helps shape the institutional organization of the economy. We show how the state shapes the economy through the manipulation of property rights. The state's actions create pressures for change that lead actors to look for new forms of economic organization. The state also assists, leads, or constrains the process of selecting new forms of economic organization that emerge in response to these pressures, and it may or may not ratify these new forms. In contrast to the conventional literature on state economy relations that characterizes the U.S. state as having a weak capacity for successful economic intervention, we argue that property rights actions afford the U.S. state a previously unrecognized source of strength. Data come primarily from historical case studies of organizational transformation in the steel, automobile, commercial nuclear energy, telecommunications, dairy, meat-packing, and railroad sectors.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness
Granovetter, M. (1985) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/228311 · Cited by 28,745
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.
O'Brien, D. P., & Williamson, O. E. (1976) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2230812 · Cited by 13,381
Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D., & Skocpol, T. R. (1985) · Cited by 2,628
Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises
Diebold, W., & Gourevitch, P. (1987) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20043124 · Cited by 1,115
Ambler, J. S. (1988) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962568 · Cited by 1,030
Economics and institutions: a manifesto for a modern institutional economics
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-3971 · Cited by 629
Regulating Business by Independent Commission
Martin, D. D., & Bernstein, M. H. (1956) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1053625 · Cited by 600
Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies
Atkinson, M. M., & Coleman, W. D. (1989) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123400005317 · Cited by 438
The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860
Kettner, J. H., & Horwitz, M. J. (1977) · Journal of Interdisciplinary History · doi:10.2307/202813 · Cited by 349
Schuck, P. H., & McCraw, T. K. (1985) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.2307/3324679 · Cited by 252
Cited by
Kostova, T., & Roth, K. (2002) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/3069293 · Cited by 2,679
Entrepreneurship in and around institutional voids: A case study from Bangladesh
Mair, J., & Marti, I. (2009) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2008.04.006 · Cited by 1,567
Institutional Theory and Institutional Change: Introduction to the Special Research Forum
Dacin, M. T., Goodstein, J. D., & Scott, W. R. (2002) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2002.6283388 · Cited by 1,512
Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 1980s
Davis, G. F., & Greve, H. R. (1997) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/231170 · Cited by 1,237
Building Inclusive Markets in Rural Bangladesh: How Intermediaries Work Institutional Voids
Mair, J., Martí, I., & Ventresca, M. J. (2012) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2010.0627 · Cited by 1,207
Metadata
- Authors
- Campbell, J. L., & Lindberg, L. N.
- Venue
- American Sociological Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1990-10
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 634
- ISSN
- 0003-1224 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2323414702
- Cited by
- 377
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 5.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Property Rights and the Organization of Economic Activity by the State. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2095861
- The paper
- Campbell, J. L., & Lindberg, L. N. (1990). Property Rights and the Organization of Economic Activity by the State. American Sociological Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095861
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
