On the Application of Inductive Logic
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The Principle of Total Evidence holds that beliefs should always be based on all available evidence.
“This invokes an epistemic meta-principle, namely the Principle of Total Evidence (Carnap 1947), according to which beliefs should always be based on all available evidence.”
From Explainable AI Isn't Enough! Rethinking Algorithmic Contestability (2026) · cites this paper as Carnap 1947
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Studies in the Logic of Explanation
Hempel, C. G., & Oppenheim, P. (1948) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/286983 · Cited by 3,174 · see citing works
Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences
Gigerenzer, G., & Brighton, H. (2009) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x · Cited by 1,801 · see citing works
The role of causal criteria in causal inferences: Bradford Hill's "aspects of association"
Ward, A. C. (2009) · Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations · doi:10.1186/1742-5573-6-2 · Cited by 120 · see citing works
“the total evidence available to a person in question at the time in question, that is to say, his total knowledge of the results of his observations" [122].”
Scientific explanation: A critical survey
Schurz, G. (1995) · Foundations of Science · doi:10.1007/bf00145406 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
Explainable AI Isn't Enough! Rethinking Algorithmic Contestability
Freiesleben, T., Meding, K., & König, G. (2026) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2605.16041
- Authors
- Carnap, R.
- Corresponding author
- Carnap, Rudolf
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1947-09
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 133
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2334811914
- Cited by
- 199
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 7
- FWCI
- 67.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Literary, Cultural, Historical Analysis
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- inductive logic, induction, inductive reasoning
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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