Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences
Open accessAbstract
Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information. In contrast to the widely held view that less processing reduces accuracy, the study of heuristics shows that less information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy. We review the major progress made so far: (a) the discovery of less‐is‐more effects; (b) the study of the ecological rationality of heuristics, which examines in which environments a given strategy succeeds or fails, and why; (c) an advancement from vague labels to computational models of heuristics; (d) the development of a systematic theory of heuristics that identifies their building blocks and the evolved capacities they exploit, and views the cognitive system as relying on an “adaptive toolbox;” and (e) the development of an empirical methodology that accounts for individual differences, conducts competitive tests, and has provided evidence for people’s adaptive use of heuristics. Homo heuristicus has a biased mind and ignores part of the available information, yet a biased mind can handle uncertainty more efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind relying on more resource‐intensive and general‐purpose processing strategies.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The paper argues that heuristics are not merely effort-saving approximations but can outperform information-heavy strategies because biased, specialized inference rules reduce variance in uncertain, sparse-data environments. It reviews less-is-more effects, ecological rationality, computational models, the adaptive toolbox, and methodology for testing heuristics.
Key findings
- Across 20 paired-comparison studies, tallying and take-the-best achieved higher predictive accuracy than multiple regression; take-the-best looked up on average only 2.4 cues, whereas multiple regression and tallying looked up 7.7 cues on average, with 95% confidence intervals ≤ .4 percentage points. Under cross-validation, take-the-best also outperformed a linear perceptron, nearest-neighbor classifier, C4.5, CART, and a conditional-validity variant across sample sizes.
- Prediction error decomposes as total error = (bias)² + variance + noise. In Guttman environments, take-the-best outperformed its greedy conditional-validity counterpart due to variance alone; in binary environments it was outperformed, also due to variance, while bias played almost no role in explaining performance differences.
- The recognition heuristic is used adaptively: name recognition of Swiss cities predicted population with recognition validity a = .86 but distance to Interlaken with a = .51; Pohl (2006) reported 89% reliance for population judgments versus 54% for distance judgments. In Richter and Späth’s critical condition, mean adherence was .82 versus .95 and .98 in other conditions, but individual-level reanalysis showed the majority still followed the recognition heuristic (9 participants 32/32 times; 8 with one exception; median 100%, 97%, and 97% across conditions).
- The 1/N equality heuristic ranked first out of 15 on certainty equivalent returns, second on turnover, and fifth on Sharpe ratio against 14 optimizing models given 10 years of stock data. The paper also argues vague labels such as representativeness and availability should be replaced by computational models because labels can explain opposite fallacies and lack independent measures.
Methods
- Review and theoretical synthesis of research on heuristics, including reanalysis of Richter and Späth (2006), simulations, and bias-variance decompositions; it is not a new primary empirical study.
- Evidence base includes 20 paired-comparison data sets (10 from Weisberg, 1985), city population tasks, Wimbledon prediction, investment allocation, and other prior studies.
- Main analytic approaches discussed are cross-validation, competitive model tests, individual-level tests, adaptive-selection tests, and bias-variance decomposition of prediction error.
Limitations
- The paper states that understanding of how the mind selects heuristics is “far from complete” and lists open questions such as whether there is a system of building blocks of heuristics similar to chemistry and how to describe relevant environmental structures.
- The paper notes that in the Richter and Späth reanalysis, “we do not know which strategy the minority … followed, as no alternative strategies were tested.”
- Evident from the text: as a review, it relies on selected prior studies and examples rather than a systematic meta-analysis, and some key demonstrations use artificial binary and Guttman environments or simulations whose generality to natural settings is not fully established.
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Claims the paper makes
0 of 84 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingreasoning
Polynomials of degree-1 and degree-2 lead to significant estimation bias because they lack the ability to capture the underlying cubic function h(x) and will therefore always differ from the underlying function.
“Polynomials of degree-1 and degree-2 lead to significant estimation bias because they lack the ability to capture the underlying cubic function h(x) and will therefore always differ from the underlying function.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
Higher degree polynomials suffer from increased variance due to their greater flexibility.
“The reason why this behavior is observed is that higher degree polynomials suffer from increased variance due to their greater flexibility.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
A degree-2 polynomial achieves a lower mean prediction error than a degree-10 polynomial.
“Finally, notice how a degree-2 polynomial achieves a lower mean prediction error than a degree-10 polynomial.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Both high- and low-degree polynomials suffer from greater error than the best predicting polynomial model, which has degree-4.
“Both high-and low-degree polynomials suffer from greater error than the best predicting polynomial model, which has degree-4.”
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The relationship between the degree of polynomial used and predictive accuracy is U-shaped.
“Here, the relationship between the degree of polynomial used and the resulting predictive accuracy is U-shaped.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingown data
The higher the degree of the polynomial, the lower the error in fitting the observed data sample.
“The higher the degree of the polynomial, the lower the error in fitting the observed data sample.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
A degree-3 polynomial achieves the lowest mean prediction error on the problem with a degree-3 underlying function.
“As one would expect, a degree-3 polynomial achieves the lowest mean prediction error on this problem.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingnone given
All the models in Fig. 2 achieved a better fit to the data than take-the-best did.
“Indeed, all the models in Fig. 2 achieved a better fit to the data than take-the-best did.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the binary environment, take-the-best performs worse than its greedy counterpart.
“First, in the binary environment, take-the-best performs worse than its greedy counterpart.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the Guttman environment, take-the-best outperforms its greedy counterpart.
“Second, in the Guttman environment, take-the-best outperforms its greedy counterpart.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Bias plays almost no role in explaining the difference in performance between the models.
“Bias plays almost no role in explaining the difference in performance between the models”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Both of these behaviors are driven by the variance component of error and the relative ability of the two strategies to keep variance within acceptable limits.
“Third, and perhaps most important, Fig. 5 reveals that both of these behaviors are driven by the variance component of error and the relative ability of the two strategies to keep variance within acceptable limits.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
A reanalysis of Richter and Späth (2006, Experiment 3) at the individual level reveals that even in the presence of conflicting information, the majority of participants still follow the recognition heuristic.
“of Richter and Spa ¨th (2006, Experiment 3) at the individual level reveals that even in the presence of conflicting information (bottom panel), the majority of participants still follow the recognition heuristic.”
- Also stated in: § 6. Homo heuristicus · plain
“A reanalysis ofRichter and Spa ¨th (2006, Experiment 3) at the individual level reveals that even in the presence of conflicting information (bottom panel), the majority of participants still follow the recognition heuristic.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Richter and Spa ¨th (2006, Experiment 3)
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- Also stated in: § 6. Homo heuristicus · plain
- Interpretationreasoning
Less-is-more effects exist: more information or computation can decrease accuracy.
“Less-is-more effects: More information or computation can decrease accuracy; therefore, minds rely on simple heuristics in order to be more accurate than strategies that use more information and time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Less information, computation, and time can improve accuracy.
“less information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
An analysis of 20 data sets showed that the result in Fig. 2 (take-the-best exceeding rivals under cross-validation) is the rule rather than the exception.
“An analysis of 20 data sets showed that the result in Fig. 2 is the rule rather than the exception (Brighton, 2006).”
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- Interpretationreasoning
The accuracy-effort trade-off does not generally hold.
“Thus, the accuracy-effort trade-off does not generally hold; there are situations where one attains higher accuracy with less effort.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In 20 studies where both tallying and multiple regression were tested by cross-validation, tallying achieved a higher predictive accuracy than multiple regression, averaged across all data sets.
“Averaged across all data sets, tallying achieved a higher predictive accuracy than multiple regression (Fig. 1).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, and Goldstein (1999)
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- Premisecitation
Baseball outfielders rely on the gaze heuristic: fix gaze on the ball, start running, and adjust running speed so that the angle of gaze remains constant.
“The gaze heuristic is the simplest one and works if the ball is already high up in the air: Fix your gaze on the ball, start running, and adjust your running speed so that the angle of gaze remains constant (see Gigerenzer, 2007).”
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- Interpretationreasoning
The rationality of heuristics is ecological, not logical.
“The rationality of heuristics is therefore ecological, not logical.”
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Nests half the area of others yielded reencounter frequencies 1.96 times greater.
“Nests half the area of others yielded reencounter frequencies 1.96 times greater (Mugford, Mallon, & Franks, 2001).”
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- Premisecitation
Chater et al.'s method of fitting the models on the learning sample and then testing these models on the entire sample (including the learning sample) favored those models that overfit the data, especially at high sample sizes.
“Yet, as Brighton (2006) showed in a reanalysis, Chater et al.'s method of fitting the models on the learning sample and then testing these models on the entire sample (including the learning sample) favored those models that overfit the data, especially at high sample sizes.”
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- Interpretationreasoning
The answer to why and when heuristics are more accurate than strategies that use more information and computation is in the match between a heuristic and its environment.
“The answer is not in the heuristic alone, but in the match between a heuristic and its environment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The discovery of less-is-more effects forces us to reassess our normative ideals of rationality.
“Most important, it has become clear that the discovery of less-is-more effects forces us to reassess our normative ideals of rationality.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The success of take-the-best seems to be due to the fact that it ignores dependencies between cues, which is adaptive when observations are sparse.
“In short, the success of take-the-best seems to be due to the fact that it ignores dependencies between cues in what turns out to be an adaptive processing policy when observations are sparse.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Ants use a pheromone trail heuristic to measure the area of a candidate nest cavity.
“To measure the area of a candidate nest cavity, a narrow crack in a rock, an ant has no yardstick but a rule of thumb: Run around on an irregular path for a fixed period while laying down a pheromone trail, and then leave.”
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- Premisecitation
The conditions under which the recognition heuristic leads to a less-is-more effect have been derived analytically.
“The conditions under which the recognition heuristic (discussed below) leads to a less-is-more effect have been derived analytically (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002)”
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- Interpretationnone given
The conditions under which tallying succeeds-low predictability of a criterion, small sample sizes relative to the number of available cues, and dependency between cues-are not infrequent in natural environments.
“Note that the conditions under which tallying succeeds-low predictability of a criterion, small sample sizes relative to the number of available cues, and dependency between cues--are not infrequent in natural environments.”
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Ordering cues by conditional validity is a costly operation, which requires recomputing the predictive value of cues against multiple reference classes of observations.
“Ordering cues by conditional validity is a costly operation, which requires recomputing the predictive value of cues against multiple reference classes of observations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Peahens investigate only three or four peacocks and choose the one with the largest number of eyespots.
“she investigates only three or four, and chooses the one with the largest number of eyespots (Petrie & Halliday, 1994).”
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- Interpretationreasoning
The existence of less-is-more effects shows that there is more to heuristics than the accuracy-effort trade-off: the mind can use less information and computation or take less time and nevertheless achieve better performance.
“The existence of these effects shows that there is more to heuristics than the accuracy-effort trade-off: The mind can use less information and computation or take less time and nevertheless achieve better performance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
When one alters the search rule of take-the-best by ordering cues by conditional validity, performance drops to the level of the more resource-intensive algorithms.
“In fact, when one alters the search rule of take-the-best by carrying out the more resource-intensive process of ordering cues by conditional validity, performance drops to the level of the more resource-intensive algorithms (Fig. 2, bottom left).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Brighton, 2006
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- Interpretationreasoning
Less-is-more effects challenge the classical definition of rational decision-making as the process of weighting and adding all information.
“Less-is-more effects are a second justification with normative consequences: They challenge the classical definition of rational decision-making as the process of weighting and adding all information.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
When accidental patterns are used to make predictions, these predictions are likely to be inaccurate.
“When accidental patterns are used to make predictions, these predictions are likely to be inaccurate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
To control variance, one must abandon the ideal of general-purpose inductive inference and instead consider specialization.
“To control variance, one must abandon the ideal of general-purpose inductive inference and instead consider, to one degree or another, specialization (Geman et al., 1992).”
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- Interpretationreasoning
We cannot remain agnostic and do both unless we are willing to make a bet on what patterns will actually occur.
“We cannot remain agnostic and do both unless we are willing to make a bet on what patterns will actually occur.”
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Prediction error can be decomposed into the sum of three components: bias squared, variance, and noise.
“Total error ¼ ðbiasÞ 2 þ variance þ noise:”
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- cites Bishop, 1995 source
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- Premisecitation
The conditions in which a beneficial degree of forgetting improves accuracy in inference have been derived analytically.
“as have the conditions in which a beneficial degree of forgetting improves accuracy in inference (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005).”
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- Interpretationcitation
To achieve low prediction error on a broad class of problems, a model must accommodate a rich class of patterns in order to ensure low bias.
“To achieve low prediction error on a broad class of problems, a model must accommodate a rich class of patterns in order to ensure low bias.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
General purpose models tend to be poor predictors of the future when data are sparse.
“This is why ''general purpose'' models tend to be poor predictors of the future when data are sparse (Geman et al., 1992).”
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- Interpretationreasoning
Diversity in the class of patterns that the model can accommodate is likely to come at a price of an increase in variance.
“The price is an increase in variance, as the model will have a greater flexibility”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
When analyzing the success of heuristics, we often find that they avoid overfitting the observations.
“As we have shown, when analyzing the success of heuristics, we often find that they avoid overfitting the observations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
An algorithm's susceptibility to bias and variance will always depend on the underlying function and on how many observations of this function are available.
“An algorithm's susceptibility to bias and variance will always depend on the underlying function and on how many observations of this function are available.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
A heuristic's accuracy is always relative to the structure of the environment.
“Its accuracy is always relative to the structure of the environment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Studies on language acquisition indicate that there are sensitive phases in which a reduced memory and simpler input ('baby talk') speeds up language acquisition.
“Studies on language acquisition indicate that there are sensitive phases in which a reduced memory and simpler input (''baby talk'') speeds up language acquisition (Elman, 1993;Newport, 1990)”
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- cites Newport, 1990
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- Interpretationreasoning
The more flexible the model, the more likely it is to capture not only the underlying pattern but unsystematic patterns such as noise.
“The more flexible the model, the more likely it is to capture not only the underlying pattern but unsystematic patterns such as noise.”
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Human performance is often characterized as optimal in generalizing from few observations.
“cognitive science is increasingly stressing the senses in which the cognitive system performs remarkably well when generalizing from few observations, so much so that human performance is often characterized as optimal (e.g., Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006;Oaksford & Chater, 1998).”
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- cites Oaksford & Chater, 1998
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- Premisecitation
Experiments with experienced handball players indicate that they make better decisions with less time.
“experiments with experienced handball players indicate that they make better decisions with less time (Johnson & Raab, 2003)”
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- Interpretationreasoning
An unbiased algorithm may suffer from high variance because the mean function may be precisely the underlying function, but the individual functions may suffer from excess variance and hence high error.
“Notice that an unbiased algorithm may suffer from high variance because the mean function may be precisely the underlying function, but the individual functions may suffer from excess variance and hence high error.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
A biased induction algorithm can predict more accurately than an unbiased one.
“there are many examples of how a biased induction algorithm can predict more accurately than an unbiased one (Hastie et al., 2001).”
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- Interpretationreasoning
The ability of the cognitive system to make accurate predictions despite sparse exposure to the environment strongly indicates that the variance component of error is successfully being kept within acceptable limits.
“From the perspective of the bias-variance dilemma, the ability of the cognitive system to make accurate predictions despite sparse exposure to the environment strongly indicates that the variance component of error is successfully being kept within acceptable limits.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Expert golfers (but not novices) do better when they have only 3 s to putt than when they can take all time they want.
“expert golfers (but not novices) do better when they have only 3 s to putt than when they can take all time they want (Beilock, Bertenthal, McCoy, & Carr, 2004;Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002).”
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- cites Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002
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- Interpretationreasoning
A heuristic is not inherently good or bad, or accurate or inaccurate.
“This is why a heuristic is not inherently good or bad, or accurate or inaccurate, as is sometimes believed.”
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A biased model can lead to more accurate predictions than an unbiased model.
“This is an example of how a biased model can lead to more accurate predictions than an unbiased model.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The variance component of prediction error is essential to understanding why a less-is-more effect in heuristic inference can often be observed.
“The variance component of prediction error will prove essential to understanding why a less-is-more effect in heuristic inference can often be observed.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Our cognitive systems are confronted with the bias-variance dilemma whenever they attempt to make inferences about the world.
“Our cognitive systems are confronted with the bias-variance dilemma whenever they attempt to make inferences about the world.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The basic flaw in the original availability research was to introduce a label after data were observed, rather than formulate a heuristic as a computational model that allows predictions to be expressed in a testable way.
“The basic flaw in the original research was to introduce a label after data were observed, rather than formulate a heuristic as a computational model that allows predictions to be expressed in a testable way.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The five consonants K, L, N, R, and V are an atypical sample because all five occur more often in the third position, whereas the majority of consonants occur more frequently in the first position.
- Rests on an assumption: There has been no successful replication of Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) availability study in the literature.
- Premisecitation
Sedlmeier, Hertwig, and Gigerenzer (1998) found that neither measure of availability could predict people's actual frequency judgments.
“The result was that neither measure of availability could predict people's actual frequency judgments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sedlmeier, Hertwig, and Gigerenzer (1998)
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- Interpretationreasoning
The performance of the greedy version of take-the-best provides a good proxy for the behavior of a number of alternative models of inductive inference.
“Consequently, the performance of the greedy version of take-the-best provides a good proxy for the behavior of a number of alternative models of inductive inference.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Very similar findings hold when the minimum description length principle is used as a model selection criterion.
“For example, very similar findings hold when the minimum description length principle is used as a model selection criterion (Brighton, 2006).”
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- Premisecitation
Within cognitive science, there has been no systematic theory of heuristics.
“Similarly, within cognitive science, there has been no such theory (although see Payne et al., 1993).”
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- Interpretationnone given
Model comparisons in natural environments show that this bet is often a good one.
“Model comparisons in natural environments show that this bet is often a good one.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premiseown data
Noncompensatory environments are one example of a class of environments for which analytic results show that take-the-best is unbiased and likely to perform well.
“Noncompensatory environments are one example of a class of environments for which we have analytic results showing that take-the-best is unbiased and likely to perform well.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Take-the-best bets on the fact that ignoring dependencies between cues is likely to result in low variance.
“In short, this comparison tells us that take-the-best bets on the fact that ignoring dependencies between cues is likely to result in low variance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The bet can also fail, even when take-the-best has zero bias.
“But as this comparison has revealed, the bet can also fail, even when takethe-best has zero bias.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The bias-variance dilemma shows formally why a mind can be better off with an adaptive toolbox of biased, specialized heuristics.
“Put simply, the bias-variance dilemma shows formally why a mind can be better off with an adaptive toolbox of biased, specialized heuristics.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Saying that a heuristic works because it avoids overfitting the data is only a shorthand explanation for what is often a more complex interaction between the heuristic, the environment, and the sample size.
“Saying that a heuristic works because it avoids overfitting the data is only a shorthand explanation for what is often a more complex interaction between the heuristic, the environment, and the sample size.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
A single, general-purpose tool with many adjustable parameters is likely to be unstable and to incur greater prediction error as a result of high variance.
“A single, general-purpose tool with many adjustable parameters is likely to be unstable and to incur greater prediction error as a result of high variance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
The priority heuristic, a one-good-reason heuristic with no free parameters, has been shown to imply several major violations of expected utility theory simultaneously, including the Allais paradox and the fourfold pattern.
“The priority heuristic, a one-good-reason heuristic with no free parameters (Brandsta ¨tter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2008;Brandsta ¨tter et al., 2006) that has similar building blocks to take-the-best, has been shown to imply (not just have parameter sets that are consistent with) several of the major violations simultaneously, including the Allais paradox and the fourfold pattern (Katsikopoulos &”
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- cites Brandsta ¨tter et al., 2006
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- cites Katsikopoulos & Gigerenzer, 2008
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- Interpretationnone given
The relative ability of two algorithms to avoid pathologies such as overfitting or excess complexity will always depend on the amount of data available.
“because the relative ability of two algorithms to avoid these pathologies will always depend on the amount of data available.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In Sedlmeier et al. (1998), the two definitions of availability showed little correlation with one another.
“Moreover, the two definitions showed little correlation with one another.”
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- Study design and conductcitation
There was no independent measure of availability in Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) study.
“there was no independent measure of availability in this study”
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- Interpretationcitation
The variance component of error is always an interaction between characteristics of the inference strategy, the structure of the environment, and the number of observations available.
“Secondly, the variance component of error is always an interaction between characteristics of the inference strategy, the structure of the environment, and the number of observations available.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The performance of a heuristic in an environment is not reflected by a single number such as predictive accuracy, but by a learning curve revealing how bias and variance change as more observations become available.
“This is why the performance of heuristic in an environment is not reflected by a single number such as predictive accuracy, but by a learning curve revealing how bias and variance change as more observations become available (Perlich, Provost, & Simonoff, 2003).”
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- Interpretationown data
Proving that another strategy achieves a better fit than take-the-best is something quite different to proving that the strategy also achieves a higher predictive accuracy.
“This result illustrates that proving that another strategy achieves a better fit than take-the-best is something quite different to proving that the strategy also achieves a higher predictive accuracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) study, two-thirds of participants judged the first position as being more likely for a majority of the five consonants.
“Two-thirds of participants judged the first position as being more likely for a majority of the five consonants.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Tversky & Kahneman, 1973
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- Interpretationreasoning
If a heuristic like take-the-best is to outperform an alternative method, it must do so by incurring less variance.
“Consequently, if a heuristic like take-the-best is to outperform an alternative method, it must do so by incurring less variance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Analytic results detailing when take-the-best is unbiased will not necessarily point to the cases in which take-the-best performs well.
“This result illustrates that analytic results detailing when take-the-best is unbiased will not necessarily point to the cases in which take-the-best performs well.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
From the perspective of bias, take-the-best offers no advantage over the alternative methods considered, because practically all models of inductive inference are capable of reproducing any response pattern that take-the-best can.
“First, from the perspective of bias, take-the-best offers no advantage over the alternative methods we have considered, because practically all models of inductive inference are capable of reproducing any response pattern that take-the-best can.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Adopting an alternative model selection criterion will not change the fact that the degree to which an algorithm is overly sensitive to the contents of the samples it learns from will depend on the size of the sample available.
“Adopting an alternative model selection criterion will not change the fact that the degree to which an algorithm is overly sensitive to the contents of the samples it learns from will depend on the size of the sample available.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The less-is-more effect demonstrated in Fig. 2 can also be explained by the relative ability of the models to control variance.
“and the less-is-more effect we demonstrated in Fig. 2 can also be explained by the relative ability of the models to control variance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Because the learning curves of two strategies can cross, the superiority of one process over another will depend on the size of the training sample.
“Because the learning curves of two strategies-such as the pairs of curves in Fig. 2-can cross, the superiority of one process over another will depend on the size of the training sample.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The recognition heuristic is likely to lead to fast and accurate judgments if the recognition validity is high, that is, a strong correlation between recognition and the criterion exists.
“For instance, the recognition heuristic is likely to lead to fast and accurate judgments if the recognition validity is high, that is, a strong correlation between recognition and the criterion exists, as is the case for tennis and other sports tournaments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Payne et al. (1993) demonstrated that people tend to select heuristics in an adaptive way.
“The work by Payne et al. (1993) additionally demonstrated that people tend to select the heuristics in an adaptive way.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Payne et al., 1993
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- Premisecitation
Rieskamp and Otto (2006) and Bröder (2003) reported that people adaptively select take-the-best when the environment has the property that cue weights vary widely.
“Rieskamp andOtto (2006) andBro ¨der (2003) reported that people adaptively select take-the-best when the environment has this property.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Rieskamp and Otto (2006)
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- cites Bro ¨der (2003)
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- Premisereasoning
For the red deer stag, the step-by-step contest heuristic is like take-the-best, but the search rule differs: the order of cues is determined by the cue that is first accessible, not by the most valid cue.
“This step-by-step heuristic is like takethe-best, but the search rule differs.The order of cues is not determined by (whatever the stag believes to be) the most valid cue, but by the cue that is first accessible.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Clutton-Brock & Albon, 1979
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- Premisecitation
Newell et al.'s results were disregarded by counting only subjects consistent with predictions in at least 90% of cases, so that only one-third (33%) behaved completely consistently with take-the-best's rules.
“Yet these results were disregarded by counting only those subjects who were consistent with the predictions in at least 90% of the cases, so that ''only one-third (33%) behaved in a manner completely consistent with TTB's search, stopping, and decision rules'' (p.82).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Newell, Weston, and Shanks (2003)
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- Premisecitation
The recognition heuristic predicted the matches of Wimbledon 2003 and 2005 with equal or higher accuracy than the ATP rankings and the seeding of the Wimbledon experts did.
“In fact, this correct inference is not an exception: This simple heuristic predicted the matches of Wimbledon 2003 and 2005 with equal or higher accuracy than the ATP rankings and the seeding of the Wimbledon experts did (Scheibehenne & Bro ¨der, 2007;Serwe & Frings, 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Scheibehenne & Bro ¨der, 2007
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- cites Serwe & Frings, 2006
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- Premisecitation
The confirmation stopping rule works well when the decision maker knows little about cue validity and cue costs are low.
“This stopping rule, termed a confirmation rule, works well in situations where (a) the decision maker knows little about the validity of the cues, and (b) the costs of cues are rather low (Karelaia, 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Karelaia, 2006
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- Interpretationreasoning
For the male deer, the adapted search rule is to search through cues in order of their environmental accessibility.
“Thus, for the male deer, the adapted search rule is: Search rule: Search through cues in order of their environmental accessibility.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
In a new task where the individual lacks experience to order cues, it is advantageous to adjust the stopping rule and decision rule to stop as soon as two cues point to the same object and infer that object has higher criterion value.
“In this case, one can prove that it is of advantage to adjust the stopping rule and consequently, the decision rule (Karelaia, 2006): Stopping rule: Stop as soon as two cues are found that point to the same object. Decision rule: Infer that this object has the higher criterion value.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Karelaia, 2006
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- Interpretationreasoning
By adapting the building blocks of heuristics, organisms can react to new tasks and changing environments.
“By adapting the building blocks of heuristics, organisms can react to new tasks and changing environments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Memory constrains the choice set of heuristics and thereby creates specific cognitive niches for different heuristics.
“The first is that memory constrains the choice set of heuristics and thereby creates specific cognitive niches for different heuristics (Marewski & Schooler, unpublished data).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Marewski & Schooler, unpublished data
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- Premisecitation
Volz et al. (2006) reported specific neural activity that corresponded to the two processes of recognition and evaluation in the use of the recognition heuristic.
“Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Volz et al. (2006) reported specific neural activity that corresponded to these two processes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Volz et al., 2006
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- Interpretationreasoning
Memory selects heuristics in a way that makes it easier and faster to apply a heuristic when it is likely to yield accurate decisions.
“The general point is that memory ''selects'' heuristics in a way that makes it easier and faster to apply a heuristic when it is likely to yield accurate decisions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
To adjust to a ball at the beginning of its trajectory, a player does not need a new heuristic, but only to adapt the third building block.
“To adjust to this new situation, a player does not need a new heuristic, but only to adapt the third building block.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
The majority of subjects switch to knowledge-based heuristics such as take-the-best when the values of both alternatives on relevant cues can be recalled.
“According to the experimental evidence, the majority of subjects switch to knowledge-based heuristics such as take-the-best when the values of both alternatives on relevant cues can be recalled (Marewski, Gaissmaier, Schooler, Goldstein, & Gigerenzer, unpublished data), consistent with an analysis of the relative ecological rationality of the two heuristics in this situation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Marewski, Gaissmaier, Schooler, Goldstein, & Gigerenzer, unpublished data
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- Interpretationreasoning
The answer to the question 'Why heuristics?' lies in their ecological rationality, that is, in the environmental structures to which a given heuristic is adapted.
“Instead, we argue that the answer to the question, ''Why heuristics?''lies in their ecological rationality, that is, in the environmental structures to which a given heuristic is adapted.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
It is not possible to assert that there is clear evidence for an alternative noncompensatory model that has not even been formulated and tested.
“Likewise, it is not possible to assert that there is clear evidence for an alternative noncompensatory model that has not even been formulated and tested.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
It is impossible to infer from means alone what proportion of individuals follow the recognition heuristic.
“It is impossible to infer from means alone what proportion of individuals follow the recognition heuristic.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Evolution has created something very close to a perfect memory.
“In fact, evolution has created something very close.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Luria (1968)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
To build a mind with zero bias assumes that one knows the true state of the world and the representations needed to model it.
“After all, to build a mind with zero bias assumes that one knows the true state of the world and the representations needed to model it.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: To build a mind with zero bias assumes that one knows the true state of the world and the representations needed to model it.
- Interpretationreasoning
The creator of Design 3 need not assume omniscience, that is, knowledge of all relevant options, consequences, and probabilities both now and in the future.
“Unlike in the previous cases, the creator of Design 3 need not assume omniscience, that is, knowledge of all relevant options, consequences, and probabilities both now and in the future.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Design 3 works well in a world where inferences have to be made from small samples, and where the future may change in unforeseen ways.
“This design works well in a world where inferences have to be made from small samples, and where the future may change in unforeseen ways (Bookstaber & Langsam, 1985).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bookstaber & Langsam, 1985
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- Interpretationreasoning
Each inference tool has a bias that can be offset by a greater reduction in variance.
“Each has a bias that can be offset by a greater reduction in variance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Homo heuristicus can rely on heuristics because they are accurate, not because they require less effort at the cost of some accuracy.
“Homo heuristicus can rely on heuristics because they are accurate, not because they require less effort at the cost of some accuracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Because a mind with no bias must choose from an infinite space of representations, it is likely to require resource-intensive cognitive processing.
“Yet because this mind has no bias and must choose from an infinite space of representations, it is likely to require resource-intensive cognitive processing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A mind with an infinitely flexible system of abstract representations works best with large samples of observations and in a relatively stable world.
“Such a mind works best with large samples of observations and in a world that is relatively stable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
In virtually every task, there are individual differences in strategies.
“Individual-level tests are essential because in virtually every task we find individual differences in strategies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Because the world is not absolutely predictable and fully observable, a perfect memory would be a waste of energy.
“Design 2 accounts for the fact that the world is not absolutely predictable and fully observable, and therefore, a perfect memory would be a waste of energy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The world is not absolutely predictable and fully observable.
- May combine two claims. 54
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 17
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
May combine two claims.
FindingreasoningUnbiased models are those of degree-3 or higher, but the higher the degree of the polynomial, the greater the prediction error.
“Unbiased models are those of degree-3 or higher, but notice that the higher the degree of the polynomial, the greater the prediction error.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningThe ordering of cues chosen by take-the-best may not provide the best fit to the observations, but when predicting new observations, it often outperforms strategies that achieved a better fit.
“For example, the ordering of cues chosen by take-the-best may not provide the best fit to the observations, but when predicting new observations, it often outperforms strategies that achieved a better fit.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn a reanalysis of Richter and Späth (2006, Experiment 3) at the individual level, even in the critical condition, the majority of participants consistently followed the recognition heuristic: nine participants followed it without a single exception (32 out of 32 times), and another eight followed it but for one single exception, whereas only a minority seemed to follow an alternative strategy.
“Even in the critical condition (Fig. 7, bottom panel), the majority of participants consistently followed the recognition heuristic: nine participants followed it without a single exception (32 out of 32 times), and another eight followed it but for one single exception, whereas only a minority seemed to follow an alternative strategy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Richter and Spa ¨th (2006)
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Findingown dataIn the city population task, take-the-best outperforms a linear perceptron, the nearest neighbor classifier, two tree induction algorithms (C4.5 and CART), and a variant of take-the-best that uses a more resource-intensive search rule that orders cues by conditional validity.
“Take-the-best outperforms (top left) a linear perceptron (essentially logistic regression); (top right) the nearest neighbor classifier; (bottom right) two tree induction algorithms, C4.5 and CART (classification and regression trees); and (bottom left) a variant of take-the-best that uses a more resource-intensive search rule that orders cues by conditional validity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingcitationWith supporting, no supporting, and conflicting evidence, the median participant followed the recognition heuristic in 100%, 97%, and 97% of inferences, respectively.
“With supporting, no supporting, and conflicting evidence, the median participant followed the recognition heuristic in 100%, 97%, and 97% of inferences, respectively.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenHeuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information.
“Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationTallying (equal weights) can predict almost as accurately as, and sometimes better than, multiple linear regression.
“researchers discovered that equal (or random) weights can predict almost as accurately as, and sometimes better than, multiple linear regression”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Dawes, 1979
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- cites Dawes & Corrigan, 1974
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- cites Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975
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PremisecitationBats, birds, and dragonflies maintain a constant optical angle between themselves and their prey, as do dogs when catching a Frisbee.
“In pursuit and predation, bats, birds, and dragonflies maintain a constant optical angle between themselves and their prey, as do dogs when catching a Frisbee (Shaffer, Krauchunas, Eddy, & McBeath, 2004).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Shaffer, Krauchunas, Eddy, & McBeath, 2004
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PremisecitationTallying succeeds when linear predictability of the criterion is moderate or small (R^2 ≤ .5), the ratio of objects to cues is 10 or smaller, and the cues are correlated.
“tallying succeeded when linear predictability of the criterion was moderate or small (R 2 £ .5), the ratio of objects to cues was 10 or smaller, and the cues were correlated (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe task of humans and other animals is to predict their world despite its inherent uncertainty, and in order to do this, they have to simplify.
“The task of humans and other animals is to predict their world despite its inherent uncertainty, and in order to do this, they have to simplify.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationWhen sample size was small or moderate (up to 40% of all objects), take-the-best outperformed or matched all competitors (neural network, exemplar models, C4.5), but when sample size was larger, more information and computation seemed to be better.
“When the percentage of training examples (the sample size) was small or moderate (up to 40% of all objects), take-the-best outperformed or matched all the competitors, but when the sample size was larger, more information and computation seemed to be better.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Chater, Oaksford, Nakisa, and Redington (2003)
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InterpretationcitationAnimals have always relied on heuristics to solve adaptive problems, and so have humans.
“As far as we can know, animals have always relied on heuristics to solve adaptive problems, and so have humans.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataRegression tended to overfit the data: it had a higher fit than tallying but a lower predictive accuracy.
“Regression tended to overfit the data, as can be seen by the cross-over of lines: It had a higher fit than tallying but a lower predictive accuracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationLess-is-more effects have been found analytically and experimentally in various domains, including the recognition heuristic, beneficial forgetting, language acquisition, handball, golf, and the prisoners' dilemma.
“These two results are instances of a broader class of less-is-more effects found in the last decades, both analytically and experimentally.”
- Also stated in: § 1.3. More information, computation, and time is not always better · plain
“The conditions under which the recognition heuristic (discussed below) leads to a less-is-more effect have been derived analytically (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) as have the conditions in which a beneficial degree of forgetting improves accuracy in inference (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002
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- cites Schooler & Hertwig, 2005
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- cites Johnson & Raab, 2003
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- Also stated in: § 1.3. More information, computation, and time is not always better · plain
The quote only partly states this claim.
Premiseown dataTake-the-best (one-good-reason heuristic) was more accurate than both multiple regression and tallying, on average across 20 studies.
“The unexpected result was that inferences relying on one good reason were more accurate than both multiple regression and tallying.”
- Also stated in: § 1.2. Ignoring cues to make better predictions: Take-the-best · plain
“We obtained the same result, on average, for 20 studies (Fig. 1).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, 1999
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- cites Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999
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- Also stated in: § 1.2. Ignoring cues to make better predictions: Take-the-best · plain
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningHomo heuristicus has a biased mind and ignores part of the available information, yet a biased mind can handle uncertainty more efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind relying on more resource-intensive and general-purpose processing strategies.
“Homo heuristicus has a biased mind and ignores part of the available information, yet a biased mind can handle uncertainty more efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind relying on more resource-intensive and general-purpose processing strategies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAlthough variance is likely to be the dominant source of error when observations are sparse, it is nevertheless controllable.
“Although variance is likely to be the dominant source of error when observations are sparse, it is nevertheless controllable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningCombating high bias requires using a rich class of models, while combating high variance requires placing restrictions on this class of models.
“This is why we are left with a dilemma: Combating high bias requires using a rich class of models, while combating high variance requires placing restrictions on this class of models.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenAll inductive processes, including heuristics, make bets.
“All inductive processes, including heuristics, make bets.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationIn psychology alone, the number of articles relying on a good fit as the only indication of a good model runs into the thousands.
“Roberts and Pashler (2000) estimated that, in psychology alone, the number of articles relying on a good fit as the only indication of a good model runs into the thousands.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Roberts and Pashler (2000)
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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone givenVariance is a source of error that occurs when making inferences from finite samples of noisy data.
“The second source of error is variance, which occurs when making inferences from finite samples of noisy data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAchieving a good fit to observations does not necessarily mean we have found a good model, and choosing the model with the best fit is likely to result in poor predictions.
“This point illustrates the fact that achieving a good fit to observations does not necessarily mean we have found a good model, and choosing the model with the best fit is likely to result in poor predictions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn Sedlmeier et al. (1998), judgments were roughly a monotonic function of the actual proportions, with regression toward the mean, overestimating low and underestimating high proportions.
“Instead, the judgments were roughly a monotonic function of the actual proportions, with a regression toward the mean, that is, an overestimation of low and an underestimation of high proportions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sedlmeier, Hertwig, and Gigerenzer (1998)
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PremisecitationThe priority heuristic makes transparent and bold predictions about choice, and it has been demonstrated when it predicts well and when it does not.
“The priority heuristic makes transparent and bold predictions about choice, and it has been demonstrated when it predicts well and when it does not (on the latter, see Birnbaum, 2008).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Birnbaum, 2008
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PremisecitationThe availability heuristic label has encompassed several meanings, including the number of instances that come to mind, the ease with which the first instance comes to mind, and recency, salience, vividness, and memorability.
“From the very beginning, this label encompassed several meanings, such as the number of instances that come to mind (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973); the ease with which the first instance comes to mind (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1996); the recency, salience, vividness, and memorability, among others (e.g., Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, 1998;Sunstein, 2000).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Tversky & Kahneman, 1973
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- cites Kahneman & Tversky, 1996
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- cites Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, 1998
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- Rests on an assumption: The use of labels is still widespread in areas such as social psychology.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationOne-word explanations such as the six general purpose heuristics are not the only surrogates for theories; other surrogates include redescription of the phenomenon and dual-process theories that postulate System 1 and System 2 characterized by lists of general terms without formal and testable definitions.
“Others include redescription of the phenomenon 1 and so-called dual-process theories of thinking that postulate a System 1 and a System 2, each characterized by a list of general terms, such as rational versus heuristic, rule-based versus associative, and conscious versus unconscious, without formal and testable definitions of the two processes”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Gilovich & Griffin, 2002
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- cites Barbey & Sloman, 2007
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- cites Sloman, 1996
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InterpretationreasoningA computational model can identify less-is-more effects, challenge the intuition that more information and computation are always better, and clarify which theories are psychologically implausible because they are computationally intractable in the real world.
“A computational model can identify less-is-more effects, challenge the intuition that more information and computation are always better, and clarify which theories are psychologically implausible because they are computationally intractable in the real world.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe greedy version of take-the-best is more successful in data fitting than take-the-best; yet when tested empirically, take-the-best nevertheless made more correct predictions.
“Second, Schmitt and Martignon (2006) proved that the greedy version of take-the-best is more successful in data fitting than take-the-best; yet when tested empirically, take-the-best nevertheless made more correct predictions (Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Schmitt and Martignon (2006)
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- cites Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002
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InterpretationreasoningIf the player sees the ball rising from the point at which it was hit with accelerating speed, the player should run backward, because the ball will hit the ground behind the player's position; if the ball rises with decreasing speed, the player needs to run toward the ball.
“If the player sees the ball rising from the point at which it was hit with accelerating speed, the player should run backward, because the ball will hit the ground behind the player's position.If, however, the ball rises with decreasing speed, the player needs to run toward the ball instead.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe gaze heuristic only works when the ball is already high in the air, but it fails if the ball is at the beginning of its trajectory.
“As pointed out, it only works when the ball is already high in the air, but it fails if the ball is at the beginning of its trajectory.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationNosofsky and Bergert (2007) compared take-the-best with additive-weighting and exemplar models of categorization and concluded that most did not use an exemplar-based strategy but followed the response time predictions of take-the-best.
“Nosofsky and Bergert (2007)compared take-the-best with both additive-weighting and exemplar models of categorization, and concluded that ''most did not use an exemplar-based strategy'' but followed the response time predictions of take-the-best.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Nosofsky and Bergert (2007)
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PremisecitationStrategy selection theory provides a quantitative model that can be understood as a reinforcement theory where the unit of reinforcement is a heuristic, and it allows predictions about the probability that a person selects one strategy within a defined set.
“Strategy selection theory (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006) provides a quantitative model that can be understood as a reinforcement theory where the unit of reinforcement is not a behavior, but a heuristic.This model allows predictions about the probability that a person selects one strategy within a defined set of strategies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rieskamp & Otto, 2006
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PremisecitationThe confirmation rule is remarkably robust and insensitive to knowledge about cue ordering, and there is experimental evidence that a substantial proportion of people rely on it as long as the problem is new.
“It is remarkably robust and insensitive to knowledge about cue ordering, and there is experimental evidence that a substantial proportion of people rely on this stopping rule as long as the problem is new (Gigerenzer, Dieckmann, & Gaissmaier, in press).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gigerenzer, Dieckmann, & Gaissmaier, in press
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Premisenone givenThere is experimental evidence that people tend to rely on the recognition heuristic if the recognition validity is high but less so if the recognition validity is low or at chance level.
“There is experimental evidence that people tend to rely on this heuristic if the recognition validity is high but less so if the recognition validity a is low or at chance level (a = .5).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe use of the recognition heuristic involves two processes: first, recognition to see whether the heuristic can be applied, and second, evaluation to judge whether it should be applied.
“Thus, the use of the recognition heuristic involves two processes: first, recognition in order to see whether the heuristic can be applied, and second, evaluation in order to judge whether it should be applied.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningTake-the-best is not a useful heuristic in every situation; more generally, no single strategy is always the best one.
“Take-the-best is not a useful heuristic in every situation; more generally, no single strategy is always the best one--otherwise, the mind would resemble a mechanic with only one tool at hand.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationBergert and Nosofsky (2007) formulated a stochastic version of take-the-best and tested it against an additive-weighting model at the individual level; they concluded that the vast majority of subjects adopted the take-the-best strategy.
“For instance, Bergert and Nosofsky (2007) formulated a stochastic version of take-the-best and tested it against an additive-weighting model at the individual level.They concluded that the ''vast majority of subjects'' (p.107) adopted the take-the-best strategy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bergert and Nosofsky (2007)
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InterpretationcitationAn arbitrary criterion was set unrealistically high for the model one wants to disprove, whereas a proper evaluation would be competitive by comparing several models.
“Here, an arbitrary criterion is set unrealistically high for the model one wants to disprove, whereas a proper evaluation would be competitive by comparing several models.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe take-the-best heuristic is more accurate when the weights of cues vary widely, but less so when they are about equal.
“Similarly, the take-the-best heuristic is more accurate when the weights of cues vary widely, but less so when they are about equal.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisenone givenSince Tinbergen (1958), biologists have experimentally studied rules of thumb in settings such as mate choice, patch leaving, and coordination of social insects, but this work has had virtually no influence on cognitive science.
“Since the Nobel prize-winning experiments of ethologist Niko Tinbergen (1958), biologists have experimentally studied rules of thumb in settings such as mate choice, patch leaving, and the coordination of individual behavior of social insects, among others (Hutchinson & Gigerenzer, 2005).Yet this beautiful work has had virtually no influence on cognitive science.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Tinbergen, 1958
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- cites Hutchinson & Gigerenzer, 2005
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PremisecitationIn Newell, Weston, and Shanks (2003), participants adhered to take-the-best's search, stopping, and decision rules in 75%, 80%, and 89% of all possible cases in Experiment 1, and in Experiment 2 in 92% for search and 89% for stopping and decision rules.
“Consider Newell, Weston, and Shanks (2003), who tested take-the-best in two experiments and found that in Experiment 1 ''participants adhered to the search, stopping, and decision rules in 75%, 80%, and 89% of all possible cases, respectively.For Experiment 2 the figures are even more impressive: 92% for the search rule and 89% for the stopping and decision rules'' (p.93).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Newell, Weston, and Shanks (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThere is a class of one-good-reason heuristics, of which take-the-best is one member, and these heuristics have three building blocks: search rules, stopping rules, and decision rules.
“Just as there is a class of such tracking heuristics, there is a class of one-good-reason heuristics, of which take-the-best is one member.These heuristics also have three building blocks: search rules, stopping rules, and decision rules.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationAn early review of process-tracing studies concluded that there is clear evidence for noncompensatory heuristics, whereas evidence for weighting and adding strategies is restricted to tasks with small numbers of alternatives and attributes.
“An early review of process-tracing studies concluded that there is clear evidence for noncompensatory heuristics, whereas evidence for weighting and adding strategies is restricted to tasks with small numbers of alternatives and attributes (Ford, Schmitt, Schechtman, Hults, & Doherty, 1989).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ford, Schmitt, Schechtman, Hults, & Doherty, 1989
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPohl (2006) reported that 89% of participants relied on the recognition heuristic in judgments of population, but only 54% in judgments of distance to Interlaken.
“Pohl (2006) reported that 89% of participants relied on the recognition heuristic in judgments of population, but only 54% in judgments of distance to Interlaken.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pohl, 2006
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBecause the content of samples of observations varies, induced representations are likely to be different, and this creates variance.
“As the content of the samples of observations in this world will vary, the induced representations are likely to be different, and this creates variance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningIn a world that is absolutely certain and predictable, perfect memory guarantees zero bias and zero variance.
“In this world, perfect memory guarantees zero bias and zero variance, as every event has been observed and perfectly memorized.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe training sessions in Newell and Shanks (2003) were too short to learn the order of cues: even with perfect memory, a participant would have needed at least 100 trials to learn the order of the two last cues, and 20 trials each for the other cues.
“But the training sessions were clearly too short to learn the order of cues: Even with perfect memory, a participant would have needed at least 100 trials to learn the order of the two last cues (to find out that the third cue is better than the fourth only in one out of 100 times), and 20 trials each for the other cues.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningModels need to be tested at the individual level, whereas conclusions from group averages are likely to be uninformative.
“As a consequence, models need to be tested at the individual level, whereas conclusions from group averages are likely to be uninformative.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningUsing the bias-variance dilemma, the ecological rationality of heuristics can be formally studied, focusing on uncertain criteria and small samples that constitute environmental structures which fast and frugal heuristics can exploit.
“Using the bias-variance dilemma, we showed how the ecological rationality of heuristics can be formally studied, focusing on uncertain criteria and small samples that constitute environmental structures which fast and frugal heuristics can exploit.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningHeterogeneity in strategies may be due to flat maxima, Darwinian variability, or strategic unpredictability in competitive games.
“This heterogeneity may be due to flat maxima, where several strategies are reasonable solutions to the same problem, or a kind of Darwinian variability that is rational if the world (or task) changes, or a strategic unpredictability that can be rational in competitive games.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIndividual-level analyses of several experiments showed that a majority of participants consistently followed the recognition heuristic in the presence of conflicting cues, while others employed, but less consistently, unidentified strategies.
“Similarly, individual-level analyses of several experiments showed that a majority of participants consistently followed the recognition heuristic in the presence of conflicting cues, while others employed, but less conistently, unidentified strategies (Pachur, T., Bro ¨der, A., & Marewski, J. N. 2008).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pachur, T., Bro ¨der, A., & Marewski, J. N. 2008
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningZero bias is neither possible nor always desirable for a real mind.
“Zero bias is neither possible nor always desirable for a real mind.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: To build a mind with zero bias assumes that one knows the true state of the world and the representations needed to model it.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAdopting the perspective of Design 3, the study of simple heuristics shows how a mind can make accurate inferences about an uncertain world efficiently and how this efficiency is crucial to adapting the mind to its environment.
“Adopting the perspective of Design 3, the study of simple heuristics shows not only how a mind can make accurate inferences about an uncertain world efficiently but also how this efficiency is crucial to adapting the mind to its environment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenIn Guttman environments, all cues have validity 1.0 and are highly correlated with both other cues and the criterion.
“In Guttman environments, all cues have validity 1.0 and are highly correlated with both other cues and the criterion.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn Newell and Shanks (2003), the ecological validities were set to .80, .75, .70, and .69, and subjects were given 60 trials with feedback to learn the order; only three out of 16 participants sought information in this order.
“For instance, in Newell and Shanks (2003), the ecological validities were set to .80,.75,.70,and .69,and subjects were given 60 trials with feedback to learn the order.The authors reported that only three out of 16 participants sought information in this order.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Newell and Shanks (2003)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningViewing humans as Homo heuristicus challenges widely held beliefs about the nature of cognitive processing and explains why less processing can result in better inferences.
“Viewing humans as Homo heuristicus challenges widely held beliefs about the nature of cognitive processing and explains why less processing can result in better inferences.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBias can be adaptive and can help to reduce estimation error.
“it exploits the fact that bias can be adaptive and can help to reduce the estimation error (Figs. 1 and 2).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationIn Richter and Späth (2006), mean adherence to the recognition heuristic was lower in the critical condition (.82) than in the other conditions (.95 and .98).
“Because the mean adherence to the recognition heuristic was lower in the critical condition (.82) than in the other conditions (.95 and .98),Richter and Spa ¨th (2006, p. 159) concluded that ''no evidence was found in favor of a noncompensatory use of recognition'' but ''clear evidence'' for integration of recognition with additional knowledge.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Richter and Spa ¨th (2006)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningDesign 2 suggests general-purpose processing strategies such as exemplar models and neural networks as models of cognition.
“This kind of design suggests general-purpose processing strategies such as exemplar models and neural networks as models of cognition (see Fig. 2).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationShereshevsky could read a page and recall it word for word, both forwards and backwards, but when asked to summarize the gist of what he read, he was more or less at a loss.
“Shereshevsky would read a page and recall it word for word, both forwards and backwards, but when he was asked to summarize the gist of what he read, he was more or less at a loss.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Luria (1968)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenBinary environments have noncompensatory weights, and the cues are uncorrelated.
“Binary environments have noncompensatory weights, and the cues are uncorrelated.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenAn infinitely flexible system of abstract representations ensures zero bias, so that whatever structure the world has, it can be reproduced perfectly.
“The ideal is to have an infinitely flexible system of abstract representations to ensure zero bias, so that whatever structure the world has, it can be reproduced perfectly.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataNo alternative strategies were tested, so it is unknown which strategy the minority of participants followed.
“We do not know which strategy the minority in the bottom panel (right side) followed, as no alternative strategies were tested.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenBinary and Guttman environments provide useful insights because they elicit drastically different relative performances between take-the-best and alternative strategies that assess conditional dependencies between cues, and because they are governed by a known underlying function that allows a bias-variance decomposition of the error incurred by the different strategies.
“Binary and Guttman environments provide useful insights because they (a) elicit drastically different relative performances between take-the-best and alternative strategies that assess conditional dependencies between cues, and (b) are governed by a known underlying function, which allows us to perform a bias-variance decomposition of the error incurred by the different strategies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The five consonants K, L, N, R, and V are an atypical sample because all five occur more often in the third position, whereas the majority of consonants occur more frequently in the first position.
“This is an atypical sample, because all five occur more often in the third position, whereas the majority of consonants occur more frequently in the first position.”
The paper relies on this without support.
There has been no successful replication of Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) availability study in the literature.
“nor has there been a successful replication in the literature”
The paper relies on this without support.
The use of labels is still widespread in areas such as social psychology.
“The use of labels is still widespread in areas such as social psychology, and it is therefore worth providing a second illustration of how researchers are misled by their seductive power.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Biology lacks a systematic theory of heuristics.
“Although examples of rules of thumb in biology are not rare, they tend to be curiosities, partly because biology lacks a systematic theory of heuristics.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
To build a mind with zero bias assumes that one knows the true state of the world and the representations needed to model it.
“After all, to build a mind with zero bias assumes that one knows the true state of the world and the representations needed to model it.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The world is not absolutely predictable and fully observable.
“Design 2 accounts for the fact that the world is not absolutely predictable and fully observable, and therefore, a perfect memory would be a waste of energy.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Natural selection tends to favor strategies that work well enough under real-world constraints, including limited time, energy, and computational capacity.
“Natural selection tends to favor strategies that work well enough under real-world constraints, including limited time, energy, and computational capacity.”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009
Section 1.3 says heuristics can achieve better performance with less information, computation, or time, and that their success depends on the environment. Section 6 likewise emphasizes their ecological fit. The copy does not establish that natural selection favors such strategies because of limited time, energy, and computational capacity; it also cautions against explaining heuristics merely as a trade-off between accuracy and effort. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredHeuristics shaped by evolutionary pressures often perform remarkably well in natural settings despite their departure from statistical optimality.
“These heuristics, shaped by evolutionary pressures, often perform remarkably well in natural settings despite their departure from statistical optimality (Cosmides and Tooby 1996; Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer 2020; Marewski and Schooler 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009
The mathematization of neuroscience reflects broader trends across the sciences, where quantitative approaches tend to displace qualitative ones regardless of explanatory adequacy.
“This “mathematization” of neuroscience reflects broader trends across the sciences, where quantitative approaches tend to displace qualitative ones, regardless of their explanatory adequacy (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer 2020).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009
Section 1.1 says social scientists routinely use multiple regression and may neglect simpler methods that predict better. It does not describe quantitative approaches displacing qualitative ones across the sciences, or connect that trend to neuroscience. Searches for mathematization and explanatory adequacy found no passage addressing that claim. (LLM, conf=0.72)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredConsumers are both evolutionarily adapted to and trained to react to nominal cues, and this training has reached a point where even overtly ordinal cues may be misinterpreted in a nominal manner.
“Consumers are both evolutionarily adapted to and trained to react to nominal cues, and this training has reached a point where even overtly ordinal cues may be (mis)interpreted in a nominal manner [63].”
From Marketing Tactics for Sustainable Fashion and the Circular Economy: The Impact of Ethical Labels on Fast Fashion Choice (2023) · cites this paper as [63]
Section 1.2 discusses how heuristics order and use cues, while section 5 discusses training participants to learn cue order; neither addresses consumers reacting to nominal cues. Searches for “nominal,” “ordinal,” and evolutionary adaptation found no passage saying that overtly ordinal cues may be interpreted nominally. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.75)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Constant Guttman cue is described as correlated and valid
MinorIn the displayed Guttman environment, Cue 5 equals 1 for every object. A constant cue cannot correlate with the criterion or discriminate between objects, so it cannot have validity 1.0 under the paper's definition of cue validity.
“In Guttman environments, all cues have validity 1.0 and are highly correlated with both other cues and the criterion.”
“A 0 0 0 0 1 0 B 0 0 0 1 1 1 C 0 0 1 1 1 2 D 0 1 1 1 1 3 E 1 1 1 1 1 4”
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Self-citationRepresentation of Structure in Similarity Data: Problems and Prospects
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Simple heuristics and rules of thumb: Where psychologists and behavioural biologists might meet
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Self-citationTake The First: Option-generation and resulting choices
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Optimal versus Naive Diversification: How Inefficient Is the 1/N Portfolio Strategy?
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Inferences under time pressure: How opportunity costs affect strategy selection
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How good are simple heuristics
Czerlinski, J., Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1999) · Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics · Cited by 273 · see citing works
Self-citationInstant Customer Base Analysis: Managerial Heuristics Often “Get It Right”
Wübben, M., & von Wangenheim, F. (2008) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jmkg.72.3.82 · Cited by 266 · see citing works
Chater, N., & Oaksford, M. (2005) · Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/0470018860.s00603 · Cited by 253 · see citing works
A Contingency Model for the Selection of Decision Strategies
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How do we tell an association from a rule? Comment on Sloman (1996).
Gigerenzer, G., & Regier, T. (1996) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.23 · Cited by 236 · see citing works
Self-citationSchmidt, F. L. (1971) · Educational and Psychological Measurement · doi:10.1177/001316447103100310 · Cited by 228 · see citing works
Empirical tests of a fast-and-frugal heuristic: Not everyone “takes-the-best”
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How Dogs Navigate to Catch Frisbees
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Categorization with limited resources: A family of simple heuristics
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Betting on one good reason : The Take the Best heuristic
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1999) · Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics · Cited by 199 · see citing works
Self-citationOn the Application of Inductive Logic
Carnap, R. (1947) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2102920 · Cited by 199 · see citing works
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Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious
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Fast, frugal, and rational: How rational norms explain behavior
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Heuristics and Biases: Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now
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More Is Not Always Better: The Benefits of Cognitive Limits
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Experimental and natural changes in the peacock's (Pavo cristatus) train can affect mating success
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Are judgments of the positional frequencies of letters systematically biased due to availability?
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Self-citationGreedoid-Based Noncompensatory Inference
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Empirical tests of the recognition heuristic
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Sequential processing of cues in memory-based multiattribute decisions
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Relations between exemplar-similarity and likelihood models of classification
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Naïve heuristics for paired comparisons: Some results on their relative accuracy
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“Take-the-Best” and Other Simple Strategies: Why and When they Work “Well” with Binary Cues
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Ignoring information in binary choice with continuous variables: When is less “more”?
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The influence of information redundancy on probabilistic inferences
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Who will win Wimbledon? The recognition heuristic in predicting sports events
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The recognition heuristic in memory‐based inference: is recognition a non‐compensatory cue?
Pachur, T., Bröder, A., & Marewski, J. N. (2007) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.581 · Cited by 109 · see citing works
Gigerenzer, G. (2002) · DIAL (Catholic University of Leuven) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195153729.001.0001 · Cited by 104 · see citing works
Self-citationOn the Complexity of Learning Lexicographic Strategies
Schmitt, M., & Martignon, L. F. (2006) · Cited by 103 · see citing works
Predicting Wimbledon 2005 tennis results by mere player name recognition
Scheibehenne, B., & Bröder, A. (2007) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2007.05.006 · Cited by 98 · see citing works
Recognition is used as one cue among others in judgment and decision making.
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One-reason decision-making: Modeling violations of expected utility theory
Katsikopoulos, K. V., & Gigerenzer, G. (2008) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/s11166-008-9042-0 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
Self-citationBrandstätter, E., Gigerenzer, G., & Hertwig, R. (2008) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.115.1.281 · Cited by 85 · see citing works
Self-citationOn the optimality of coarse behavior rules
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Why You Think Milan is Larger than Modena: Neural Correlates of the Recognition Heuristic
Volz, K. G., Schooler, L. J., Schubotz, R. I., Raab, M., Gigerenzer, G., & von Cramon, D. Y. (2006) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.2006.18.11.1924 · Cited by 75 · see citing works
Self-citationKarelaia, N. (2005) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.09.003 · Cited by 60 · see citing works
Birnbaum, M. H. (2008) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.115.1.253 · Cited by 59 · see citing works
Robust inference with simple cognitive models
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Self-citationLimitations of exemplar models of multi-attribute probabilistic inference.
Nosofsky, R. M., & Bergert, F. B. (2007) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.33.6.999 · Cited by 45 · see citing works
Making Good Decisions with Minimal Information: Simultaneous and Sequential Choice
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The accuracy of Buffon's needle: a rule of thumb used by ants to estimate area
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Johnson, E. J., & Goldstein, D. (2003) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1091721 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
Applying one reason decision-making: the prioritisation of literature searches
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Introduction to Machine Learning
Ünsalan, C., Höke, B., & Atmaca, E. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-69421-9_5 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
Der Ungewissheit ein Schnippchen schlagen
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Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 11
- Brighton H., 2006, AAAI spring symposium: Cognitive science principles meet AI‐hard problems, 17
- Bröder A., Ecological rationality: Intelligence in the world
- Dawkins R., 1989, The selfish gene
- Gigerenzer G., Ecological rationality: Intelligence in the world
- Gigerenzer G., 1999, Simple heuristics that make us smart, 75
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- Simon H. A., 1991, Models of my life
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Reconciling modern machine-learning practice and the classical bias–variance trade-off
Belkin, M., Hsu, D., Ma, S., & Mandal, S. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1903070116 · Cited by 1,595 · see citing works
Jones, M., & Love, B. C. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10003134 · Cited by 533 · see citing works
McKay, R. T., & Dennett, D. C. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09990975 · Cited by 474 · see citing works
Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience.
Bowers, J. S., & Davis, C. J. (2012) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0026450 · Cited by 436 · see citing works
Suboptimality in perceptual decision making
Rahnev, D., & Denison, R. N. (2018) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x18000936 · Cited by 342 · see citing works
Heuristic decision making in medicine
Marewski, J. N., & Gigerenzer, G. (2012) · Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience · doi:10.31887/dcns.2012.14.1/jmarewski · Cited by 377 · see citing works
Self-citationRational approximations to rational models: alternative algorithms for category learning
Sanborn, A. N., Griffiths, T. L., & Navarro, D. J. (2010) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0020511 · Cited by 369 · see citing works
The use of Web analytics for digital marketing performance measurement
Järvinen, J., & Karjaluoto, H. (2015) · Industrial Marketing Management · doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2015.04.009 · Cited by 364 · see citing works
Risk, uncertainty, and heuristics
Mousavi, S., & Gigerenzer, G. (2014) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.02.013 · Cited by 335 · see citing works
Self-citationHeuristics as adaptive decision strategies in management: HEURISTICS IN MANAGEMENT
Artinger, F., Petersen, M., Gigerenzer, G., & Weibler, J. (2015) · Journal of Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1002/job.1950 · Cited by 255 · see citing works
Self-citationDoes Explainable Artificial Intelligence Improve Human Decision-Making?
Alufaisan, Y., Marusich, L. R., Bakdash, J. Z., Zhou, Y., & Kantarcioglu, M. (2021) · Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1609/aaai.v35i8.16819 · Cited by 106 · see citing works
Hong, J. W., Peng, Q., & Williams, D. (2021) · New Media & Society · doi:10.1177/1461444820925798 · Cited by 102 · see citing works
Satisficing: Integrating Two Traditions
Artinger, F. M., Gigerenzer, G., & Jacobs, P. (2022) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20201396 · Cited by 90 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Anchoring Effect in Decision-Making with Visual Analytics
Cho, I., Wesslen, R., Karduni, A., Santhanam, S., Shaikh, S., & Dou, W. (2017) · 2017 IEEE Conference on Visual Analytics Science and Technology (VAST) · doi:10.1109/vast.2017.8585665 · Cited by 88 · see citing works
A theory of learning to infer.
Dasgupta, I., Schulz, E., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Gershman, S. J. (2020) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000178 · Cited by 70 · see citing works
The myth of the Bayesian brain
Mangalam, M. (2025) · European Journal of Applied Physiology · doi:10.1007/s00421-025-05855-6 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
“This “mathematization” of neuroscience reflects broader trends across the sciences, where quantitative approaches tend to displace qualitative ones, regardless of their explanatory adequacy (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer 2020).”
Hamlin, R. P., & McNeill, L. S. (2023) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su151310331 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
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Mathematical Definition, Mapping, and Detection of (Anti)Fragility
Taleb, N. N., & Douady, R. (2012) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1208.1189
“Ironically, it is from the multiplication of convexity biases and the potential errors from missing them that calibrated models that work in-sample underperform heuristics out-of-sample (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009).”
BackgroundJaveed, S., Rasool, G., & Pathania, A. (2026) · International Journal of Consumer Studies · doi:10.1111/ijcs.70266
- Authors
- Gigerenzer, G., & Brighton, H.
- Affiliations
- Max Planck Institute for Human Development (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Gigerenzer, Gerd
- ORCID
- Gigerenzer, Gerd
- Venue
- Topics in Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-01
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 107-143
- ISSN
- 1756-8757 (ISSN-L)
- 1756-8765
- OpenAlex
- W2157581667
- Semantic Scholar
- 284006b34c50429aa3c5f6d367c279702272219c
- Cited by
- 1,801
- References
- 144
- Citations by year
- 2026: 75 · 2025: 120 · 2024: 136 · 2023: 150 · 2022: 121 · 2021: 127 · 2020: 112 · 2019: 124 · 2018: 111 · 2017: 120 · 2016: 120 · 2015: 111 · 2014: 87 · 2013: 80 · 2012: 98
- FWCI
- 8.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Topics in Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
- Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion)
- Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Keywords
- heuristics, ecological rationality, adaptive toolbox, cognitive biases, inference accuracy, individual differences
- MeSH terms
- Adaptation, Psychological, Cognition, Humans, Models, Psychological, Psychological Theory, Thinking
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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