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The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of Semantics
Abstract
X is true if, and only if, p. [...] we shall call a definition of truth “adequate” if all these equivalences follow from it. [...] The definition of truth which was outlined above [...] implies all equivalences of the form (T). In this connnection it is important to notice that the conditions for the material adequacy of the definition determine uniquely the extension of the term “true.” Therefore, every definition of truth which is materially adequate would necessarily be equivalent to that actually constructed. The semantic conception of truth gives us, so to speak, no possibility of choice between variaous non-equivalent definitions of this notion..
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Cited by
Studies in the Logic of Explanation
Hempel, C. G., & Oppenheim, P. (1948) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/286983 · Cited by 3,174
Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception
Matthen, M. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199268509.001.0001 · Cited by 333
Sikos, L. F., & Philp, D. (2020) · Data Science and Engineering · doi:10.1007/s41019-020-00118-0 · Cited by 60
Assimakopoulos, S. (2026) · doi:10.1017/9781009378376 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Tarski, A.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1944-03
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 341
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3183889129
- Cited by
- 1,640
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 20.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Tarski, A. (1944). The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of Semantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://doi.org/10.2307/2102968
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
