CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 333Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsEmbodied and Extended Cognition

Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception

Matthen, Mohan·2005
DOI 10.1093/0199268509.001.0001
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is a philosophical framework for thinking about sensory systems as active devices for data extraction B rather than, in the traditional way, as passive recorders of ambient energy patterns. Sensory systems are automatic sorting machines that assign real-world objects to classes. A sense feature is the property of belonging to such a class. A sensory experience, or sensation, is a label that the system uses in order to allow the organism access to the classifications that it has performed. This Sensory Classification Thesis (SCT), discussed in Chs 1–3, inverts the normally assumed relationship between sensory classes and sensations. Philosophers standardly hold that red is to be defined in terms of the sensation of red; here, sensations derive from sensory classes and are thus unsuitable for defining them. SCT is a simplification: some sensory systems order real-world objects in relations of similarity, and do not just put them into discrete classes (Chs 4–5). SCT makes sense of sensory specialization across species—different kinds of organisms employ different classification schemes to serve their idiosyncratic data-extraction needs (Chs 6–8). This leads to an output-driven account of sensory content. Sense features are defined in terms of their aptness for epistemic (not just sensorimotor) actions, and the content of sensations in terms of the features with which they are associated by an internal convention (Chs 9–11). This leads to a form of realism: sensory classifications are correct if the states of affairs in which they consistently occur are indeed right for the actions with which they are paired. Finally, the nature of object perception is explored: Chs 12–13 speculate about the psychological origins of sensory reference and of the feeling in perception that external objects are present (by contrast, for instance, with objects depicted in paintings and photographs).

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/0199268509.001.0001

Cites

236 of 236 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
Matthen, M.
Affiliations
University of British Columbia (CA)
Corresponding author
Matthen, Mohan
ORCID
Matthen, Mohan
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Published
2005-02-10
DOI
10.1093/0199268509.001.0001
OpenAlex
W2475578069
Cited by
333
References
236
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 26 · 2024: 31 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 19 · 2012: 14
FWCI
11.39
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
sensation, object perception, similarity relations, epistemic actions

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review