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Qualities and Qualia: What's in the Mind?

Shoemaker, Sydney · 1990 · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Abstract

Since the I7th century, a central issue in metaphysics and epistemology has concerned the status of what, following John Locke, have come to be called secondary qualities: colors, odors, tastes, sounds, warmth and coldness, etc. The problem is posed by the fact that while these qualities are experienced as belonging to objects in our external environment the apple is experienced as red, the rose as fragrant, the lemon as sour, etc. the scientific world-view, as developed in the I 7th century and subsequently, seems to allow no place for them among the objective properties of material bodies. A common solution has been to deny, in one way or another, that these qualities do objectively inhere in external things in the way we experience them as doing. Galileo seems to have held that colors, etc., are properties of our sensations rather than of external things. Locke sometimes wrote as if that were his view as well, although his official view, as I read him, was that colors and the like are in objects to produce certain sorts of in us. On a natural understanding of it, the difference between Locke's view and Galileo's is semantical rather than metaphysical. Both hold that our sensations or ideas have what for the moment I will call subjective properties, which are immediately accessible to our consciousness and have no resemblance to any properties inhering in external objects, and both would allow, no doubt, that in virtue of the properties that do inhere in external objects, what Locke called their primary qualities, such objects have powers to produce in us sensations or ideas having certain of these subjective properties. But while the one view says that colors and the like are themselves these subjective properties, the other says that they are powers to produce sensations or ideas having them. This appears to be a disagreement not about what sorts of things or properties there are in the world (including our minds) but about which of these are the referents of

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Metadata

Authors
Shoemaker, S.
Venue
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1990
Volume
50
Pages
109
ISSN
0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2088277324
Cited by
207
References
0
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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