Cited by 23Philosophy and Theoretical SciencePhilosophy and History of ScienceFree Will and Agency

Assessing the commensurability of theories of consciousness: on the usefulness of common denominators in differentiating, integrating and testing hypotheses

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Evers, K., Farisco, M., Pennartz, C.M.A.·2024·Consciousness and Cognition

Abstract

How deep is the current diversity in the panoply of theories to define consciousness, and to what extent do these theories share common denominators? Here we first examine to what extent different theories are commensurable (or comparable) along particular dimensions. We posit logical (and, when applicable, empirical) commensurability as a necessary condition for identifying common denominators among different theories. By consequence, dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness can be proposed. Next, we compare a limited subset of neuroscience-based theories in terms of commensurability. This analysis does not yield a denominator that might serve to define a minimally unifying model of consciousness. Theories that seem to be akin by one denominator can be remote by another. We suggest a methodology of comparing different theories via multiple probing questions, allowing to discern overall (dis)similarities between theories. Despite very different background definitions of consciousness, we conclude that, if attention is paid to the search for a common methological approach to brain-consciousness relationships, it should be possible in principle to overcome the current Babylonian confusion of tongues and eventually integrate and merge different theories.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103668

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89 of 89 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Widespread evidence suggests that prediction or representation is a key brain function in realizing a plethora of sensory, motor, and cognitive processes, some carried out consciously and others not.

    “Widespread evidence suggests that prediction or representation is a key brain function in realizing a plethora of sensory, motor, and cognitive processes”
  • Although the findings of a few experiments are seldom sufficient to definitively refute an entire theory, such data are expected to inform the debate (and future research) by clarifying which theory enjoys the most empirical support.

    “Although the findings of a few experiments are seldom sufficient to definitively refute an entire theory -perhaps no bad thing considering the relative immaturity of consciousness science (Evers et al., 2024; Negro et al., 2024; Wiese, 2018) -such data are expected to inform the debate (and future research) by clarifying which theory enjoys the most empirical support (Corcoran et al., 2023).”

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Authors
Evers, K., Farisco, M., & Pennartz, C. M. A.
Affiliations
  • Uppsala University (SE)
  • University of Amsterdam (NL)
Corresponding author
Evers, K.
Venue
Consciousness and Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2024-03
Volume
119
Pages
103668
ISSN
1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4392214417
Cited by
22
References
93
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 5
FWCI
1.62
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Uppsala University Publications (Uppsala University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • Universiteit van Amsterdam
  • European Commission (EIC 101071178)
  • Templeton World Charity Foundation (0646)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
theory of consciousness, commensurability, common denominators, theory comparison, theoretical integration, hypothesis testing
MeSH terms
Attention, Brain, Consciousness, Humans, Neurosciences

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