The DOI matches its Crossref record.
The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.
Abstract
Preface 1. Principles of Rational Decision Two Paradigms of Rational Decision Expected Utility The Theory of Games Integrating the Two Paradigms 2. Dynamic Deliberation: Equilibria Deliberational Dynamics and Game Theory Deliberational Equilibria Games Played by Bayesian Deliberators Equilibrium Selection The Bayes Dynamics Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium for the Normal Form Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium for the Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria Equilibria and Rationality 3. Dynamic Deliberation: Stability Dynamic Stability of Equilibria Imprecise Priors and Elicitation through Deliberation Structural Stability I Structural Stability II Stability and Rationality 4. The Value of Knowledge Good Thinking Probable Knowledge Ramsey's Anticipation Dynamic Probability and Generalized Learning Generalized Learning Generalized Generalized Causal Decision Theory Deliberational Equilibrium Reconsidered M Is for Martingale 5. Dynamic Coherence Pumping Gold Coherent Expectations Utility Prevision and Measure Coherent Preferences and Upper and Lower Probabilities Dynamic Coherence Bayes' Rule Bayes' Method Probability Kinematics Black-Box Learning and Higher-Order Probabilities Rules and Reference Coherence and Deliberation 6. Good Habits On the Rational Stability of Good Habits Finite Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Beyond Common Knowledge of Rationality Choosing Good Habits Just Habits The Social Contract Revisited Taking Turns Good Habits and Game Theory 7. Prospects for a Theory of Rational Deliberation Consistency Proofs Causal Independence and Rationalizability Nash Equilibrium Reconsidered Dynamics Fictitious Play by Carnapians More Sophisticated Deliberators The Tracing Procedure Toward a Theory of Dynamic Deliberation Appendix. Deliberational Dynamics on Your Personal Computer Notes References Index
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
(2011) · SpringerReference · doi:10.1007/springerreference_60360 · Cited by 2,855
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (2003) · Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society · doi:10.1090/s0273-0979-03-00988-1 · Cited by 1,354
Evolution of the Social Contract
Skyrms, B. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139924825 · Cited by 743
Self-citationLogical Dynamics of Information and Interaction
van Benthem, J. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511974533 · Cited by 505
Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium
Foster, D. P., & Vohra, R. V. (1997) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1997.0595 · Cited by 365
Metadata
- Authors
- Jeffrey, R., & Skyrms, B.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1992-09
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 734
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2089639590
- Cited by
- 308
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 13.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2108221
- The paper
- Jeffrey, R., & Skyrms, B. (1992). The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://doi.org/10.2307/2108221
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.