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Cited by 258

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Explaining Bank Failures: Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Efficiency

Wheelock, David C., Wilson, Paul W.·1995·The Review of Economics and Statistics

Abstract

This paper uses micro-level historical data to examine the causes of bank failure.For statecharactered Kansas banks during 19 10-28, time-to-failure is explicitly modeled using a proportional hazards framework.In addition to standard financial ratios, this study includes membership in the voluntary state deposit insurance system and measures of technical efficiency to explain bank failure.The results indicate that deposit insurance system membership increased theprobability of failure and banks which were technically inefficient were more likely to fail than technically efficient banks.

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Metadata

Authors
Wheelock, D. C., & Wilson, P. W.
Venue
The Review of Economics and Statistics
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1995-11
Volume
77
Issue
4
Pages
689
ISSN
0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3125736284
Cited by
258
References
19
FWCI
4.07
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Explaining Bank Failures: Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Efficiency. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2109816
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Wheelock, D. C., & Wilson, P. W. (1995). Explaining Bank Failures: Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Efficiency. The Review of Economics and Statistics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2109816

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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.