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Cited by 279

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring

Open access
Gropp, Reint, Vesala, Jukka·2004·European Finance Review

Abstract

Abstract The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities.

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Crossref · 10.1007/s10679-004-6280-0

Cites

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Gropp, R., & Vesala, J.
Venue
European Finance Review
Published
2004
Volume
8
Issue
4
Pages
571-602
ISSN
  • 1382-6662 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-3097
  • 1573-692X
OpenAlex
W2101159756
Cited by
279
References
12
FWCI
19.74
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s10679-004-6280-0
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Gropp, R., & Vesala, J. (2004). Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring. European Finance Review. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10679-004-6280-0

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.