The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring
Open accessAbstract
Abstract The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities.
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Citations
Cites
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261155 · Cited by 9,369
Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's‐Length Debt
RAJAN, R. G. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04662.x · Cited by 3,902
Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. (2002) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3932(02)00171-x · Cited by 1,371
Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation
GORTON, G., & PENNACCHI, G. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05080.x · Cited by 1,076
Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking
Matutes, C., & Vives, X. (2000) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00057-9 · Cited by 515
Building an incentive-compatible safety net
Calomiris, C. W. (1999) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(99)00028-x · Cited by 407
Explaining Bank Failures: Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Efficiency
Wheelock, D. C., & Wilson, P. W. (1995) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/2109816 · Cited by 258
Why Do Banks Fail? Evidence from the 1920s
Alston, L. J., Grove, W. A., & Wheelock, D. C. (1994) · Explorations in Economic History · doi:10.1006/exeh.1994.1017 · Cited by 187
DEPOSIT INSURANCE and BANK FAILURES: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE 1920s
Wheelock, D. C. (1992) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01979.x · Cited by 135
Deposit insurance and risk-taking behavior in the credit union industry
Karels, G. V., & McClatchey, C. A. (1999) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00074-0 · Cited by 107
Cited by
Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking
Nier, E., & Baumann, U. (2006) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2006.03.001 · Cited by 695
Consolidation in banking and financial stability in Europe: Empirical evidence
Uhde, A., & Heimeshoff, U. (2009) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.01.006 · Cited by 537
Taking Stock: Monetary Policy Transmission to Equity Markets
Ehrmann, M., & Fratzscher, M. (2004) · Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking · doi:10.1353/mcb.2004.0063 · Cited by 465
How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis
Anginer, D., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Zhu, M. (2014) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.09.013 · Cited by 419
Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies
Gropp, R., Hakenes, H., & Schnabel, I. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq114 · Cited by 358
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Gropp, R., & Vesala, J.
- Venue
- European Finance Review
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 571-602
- ISSN
- 1382-6662 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-3097
- 1573-692X
- OpenAlex
- W2101159756
- Cited by
- 279
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 19.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.