The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms
Abstract
This paper begins with a contrast between the conclusions of theoretical and empirical work on distributive policy-making. The former predicts that a minimum winning coalition will make public policy; the latter reveals universal or unanimous coalitions. This paper presents a model whose predictions conform to empirical findings. It first defines a "Distributive Legislative Game" and then shows that the set of minimum winning coalitions is the core of the game. To explain the observation of unanimous coalitions, it is shown that another game, the "Universalism Legislative Game," which allows only the coalition of the whole, dominates the previous game in the sense that the ex ante expected benefits are higher for all legislators. The observed "norm" of universal coalitions in Congress is thus interpreted as legislators choosing the rules of the game to maximize their expected benefits.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
UNCERTAINTY AND THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL CARE
Arrow, K. J. (2003) · Uncertain Times · doi:10.2307/j.ctv11sn34h.6 · Cited by 4,078
Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew
Page, B. I. (1975) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2148248 · Cited by 3,130
An Introduction to Positive Political Theory
Riker, W. H., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1973) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 972
Buchanan, J. M. (1962) · Cited by 938
Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice
Rae, D. W. (1969) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400261467 · Cited by 442
Barbier, M., & Schelling, T. C. (1963) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1910005 · Cited by 346
The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It
Fiorina, M. P. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400259376 · Cited by 309
Probability models of collective decision making
Niemi, R. G., & Weisberg, H. F. (1972) · Merrill eBooks · Cited by 286
Aumann, R. J., & Kurz, M. (1977) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914063 · Cited by 245
Cited by
Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda
Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592704040472 · Cited by 3,175
Legislative leviathan: party government in the House
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.31-0579 · Cited by 2,313
Baron, D. P., & Ferejohn, J. A. (1989) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961664 · Cited by 1,970
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics
Weingast, B. R., Shepsle, K. A., & Johnsen, C. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260997 · Cited by 1,736
Self-citationInformation and Legislative Organization
Krehbiel, K. (1991) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.8850 · Cited by 1,718
Metadata
- Authors
- Weingast, B. R.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1979-05
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 245
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1864519938
- Cited by
- 666
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 17.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.