The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration
Abstract
This paper pursues a better understanding of regulatory independence by investigating the link between presidential administration and the performance of the independent regulatory commissions. The data are drawn from three independent commissions-the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission-and separate time-series analyses are conducted for periods covering the Truman years through 1977. Attention centers on whether and how the prevailing patterns of regulatory performance have been altered as different administrations have assumed formal charge of the government. The analysis suggests that regulatory behavior does shift across administrations, and that it varies systematically with presidential partisanship. Presidents apparently do achieve a measure of direction and control over the independent commissions.
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Cites
(1963) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 15,085
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Hibbs, D. A. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400269712 · Cited by 3,368
Intervention Analysis with Applications to Economic and Environmental Problems
Box, G. E. P., & Tiao, G. C. (1975) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1975.10480264 · Cited by 2,383
Theories of Economic Regulation
Posner, R. (1974) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.3386/w0041 · Cited by 1,481
Regulating Business by Independent Commission
Martin, D. D., & Bernstein, M. H. (1956) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1053625 · Cited by 600
A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement
Posner, R. A. (1970) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466698 · Cited by 272
The Regulation Game: Strategic Use of the Administrative Process
Saba, R., Owen, B. M., & Braeutigam, R. R. (1979) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1057457 · Cited by 159
The Determinants of Antitrust Activity
Siegfried, J. J. (1975) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466823 · Cited by 60
Public Regulation of National Securities Exchanges: A Test of the Capture Hypothesis
Schwert, G. W. (1977) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003490 · Cited by 42
Cited by
The Political Economy of Federalism
Chubb, J. E. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956245 · Cited by 1,444
The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Wood, B. D., & Waterman, R. W. (1991) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1963851 · Cited by 750
Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?
Waterman, R. W., & Meier, K. J. (1998) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024377 · Cited by 713
Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB
Moe, T. M. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956250 · Cited by 544
Self-citationPathologies of accountability: ICANN and the challenge of “multiple accountabilities disorder”
Koppell, J. G. (2005) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2005.00434.x · Cited by 495
Metadata
- Authors
- Moe, T. M.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1982-05
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 197
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2074667708
- Cited by
- 271
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 24.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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