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The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Abstract
A new paradigm of political-bureaucratic relations emerged through the 1980s holding that U.S. democratic institutions continuously shape nonelective public bureaucracies. Several empirical studies support the paradigm with evidence suggestive of political manipulation but none reveals the scope or specific mechanisms of political control. We explore the dynamics of political control of the bureaucracy explicitly to determine the scope and mechanisms. We examine output time series from seven different public bureaucracies for responsiveness to political tools applied in the late Carter and early Reagan administrations. We find responsiveness in all seven cases. The evidence also shows that political appointments—a shared power of the president and Congress—is the most important instrument of political control; changing budgets, legislation, congressional signals, and administrative reorganizations are less important. These findings confirm intuitive assertions by institutional scholars and suggest a method of “policy monitoring” that could enhance future democratic control of the bureaucracy.
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Cites
A new look at the statistical model identification
Akaike, H. (1974) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.1974.1100705 · Cited by 51,879
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
McCubbins, M. D., & Schwartz, T. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110792 · Cited by 2,936
The New Economics of Organization
Moe, T. M. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110997 · Cited by 1,974
Cited by
Majone, G. (1997) · Journal of Public Policy · doi:10.1017/s0143814x00003524 · Cited by 1,358
The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU
Pollack, M. A. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199251177.001.0001 · Cited by 888
Van Slyke, D. M. (2006) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mul012 · Cited by 885
Sowa, J. E., & Selden, S. C. (2003) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/1540-6210.00333 · Cited by 421
Monitoring and enforcement of environmental policy
Cohen, M. A. (1999) · The International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics 1999/2000 · doi:10.4337/9781035365913.00009 · Cited by 300
Metadata
- Authors
- Wood, B. D., & Waterman, R. W.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991-09
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 801-828
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2148426523
- Cited by
- 750
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 64.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Wood, B. D., & Waterman, R. W. (1991). The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy. American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/1963851
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