The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence
Abstract
This analysis demonstrates that important implications of the multidimensional voting model are robust to significant changes in the model's assumptions. (1) If candidates in the model are allowed to be partially or totally interested in the election's policy outcomes, convergence to the median must still occur. (2) If candidates are uncertain about voters' responses, and therefore attempt to maximize the probability of winning, the candidate platforms should still converge in equilibrium under weak assumptions about symmetry of the candidates' situations. (3) If both of these nonstandard assumptions are made together, the convergence result no longer holds; but small departures from the classic assumptions lead to only small departures from convergence. In combination with other recent multidimensional voting models that examine behavior in the absence of a median, this study indicates the usefulness of the traditional model for conceptualizing electoral politics.
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Cites
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Cited by
Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game
Alesina, A. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884222 · Cited by 1,322
Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game
Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (1986) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2131098 · Cited by 1,274
A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics
Bawn, K., Cohen, M., Karol, D., Masket, S., Noel, H., & Zaller, J. (2012) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592712001624 · Cited by 859
Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections
Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J. M., & Stewart, C. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669364 · Cited by 820
A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage
Groseclose, T. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669329 · Cited by 754
Metadata
- Authors
- Calvert, R. L.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1985-02
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 69
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2326075559
- Cited by
- 825
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 21.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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