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Rational Voting and Candidate Entry under Plurality Rule
Abstract
We analyze a formal model of electoral competition under plurality rule that is characterized by two novel features. First, rather than assuming a fixed field of candidates, we allow candidates to make decisions regarding entry, as well as location. Second, voters in our model are strategically rational, that is, they maximize utility over expected policy outcomes, rather than simply voting for the ideologically closest candidate. Given these assumptions, all equilibria in this model are such that the set of entrants locates at the median voter's ideal point. This result stands in sharp contrast to earlier models of multicandidate competition in which entry is not allowed and voters vote sincerely.
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Citations
Cited by
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
Besley, T., & Coate, S. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555136 · Cited by 1,649
Why dominant parties lose: Mexico's democratization in comparative perspective
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-6403 · Cited by 479
Myerson, R. B., & Weber, R. J. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938959 · Cited by 466
Leech, B. L. (2010) · The Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199542628.003.0028 · Cited by 91
EL COSTO DE COORDINAR: NÚMERO DE CANDIDATOS PRESIDENCIALES EN AMÉRICA LATINA 1993-2010
LUJÁN, D. (2017) · Revista de ciencia política (Santiago) · doi:10.4067/s0718-090x2017000100002 · Cited by 13
Metadata
- Authors
- Feddersen, T. J., Sened, I., & Wright, S. G.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1990-11
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1005
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2313126432
- Cited by
- 177
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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