The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits
Abstract
Empirical studies of distributive politics fail to offer any systematic evidence of a relationship between committee seniority in Congress and the geographic distribution of federal benefits. These findings are at odds with many descriptive accounts of the seniority norm for which such a relationship is a presupposition. Evidence and intuition appear at odds with each other. This study offers a partial reconciliation. The death of Senator Henry Scoop Jackson provides the somewhat macabre backdrop to a novel empirical examination of the seniority/benefit relationship. Evidence is provided through stock market reactions to Jackson's death across various constituent interests of Henry Jackson and Sam Nunn, Jackson's successor as ranking minority member on the Senate Armed Services Committee. The results support the hypothesis that a seniority/benefit relationship exists.
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- Roberts, B. E.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1990-02
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 31
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1973447795
- Cited by
- 473
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 28.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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