The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information Transmission in Debate
Abstract
The paper considers the informational role of legislative debate, modeled as cheap-talk. In such circumstances, can debate affect legislative decisions? Through a series of examples, based on an endogenous agenda-setting model of legislative decision making, I argue (I) that debate can only affect outcomes when the legislators' underlying preferences are not too dissimilar (cf. Crawford and Sobel 1982) and (2) that the only informational role of debate for legislative decisions is one of timing; that is, the information commonly available at the final stage of decision making (voting) when there is no debate is identical to that commonly available with debate. So debate does not elicit information that otherwise would not be made available during the decision-making process. Instead, it allows individuals to share their private data in time for them to be used in agenda setting rather than only in voting.
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Citations
Cites
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Optimal Statistical Decisions.
Siegmund, D., & DeGroot, M. H. (1972) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2284675 · Cited by 3,386
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885060 · Cited by 3,201
Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games
Farrell, J. (1993) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1993.1029 · Cited by 507
Congressional procedures and the policy process
(1996) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-4204 · Cited by 422
Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
Matthews, S. A. (1989) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937851 · Cited by 217
Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation
Austen‐Smith, D., & Riker, W. H. (1987) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962682 · Cited by 156
Self-citationAgendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information
Ordeshook, P. C., & Palfrey, T. R. (1988) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111131 · Cited by 72
Austen‐Smith, D. (1990) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/bf01832923 · Cited by 28
Self-citation
Cited by
Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations
Dryzek, J. S. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019925043x.001.0001 · Cited by 1,728
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Austen-Smith, D., & Banks, J. S. (1996) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082796 · Cited by 1,062
Self-citationFarrell, J., & Rabin, M. (1996) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.10.3.103 · Cited by 1,012
Brunia, C. H. M., & van Boxtel, G. J. M. (2001) · International Journal of Psychophysiology · doi:10.1016/s0167-8760(01)00179-9 · Cited by 721
Krishna, V., & Morgan, J. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530151144159 · Cited by 531
Metadata
- Authors
- Austen-Smith, D.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1990-02
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 124
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2008396015
- Cited by
- 382
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 17.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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