Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 217

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Groups in Rational Turnout Models

Morton, Rebecca B. · 1991 · American Journal of Political Science

Abstract

A model of the strategic calculus of voting that incorporates the behavior of groups is presented. If candidates choose different positions, positive turnout is possible in (partial) equilibrium and is generally larger than that without group rationality. Nevertheless, if candidates are probability maximizers and a unique (general) equilibrium exists, the candidates will choose equivalent positions and turnout will be zero even with group rationality. But if candidates care about both policy and winning, they will choose different positions and cause positive turnout. This turnout will be larger than that that would occur without group rationality. Group rationality, alone, cannot explain positive turnout in a (general) equilibrium theory of elections; it does imply larger turnout in conjunction with policy-oriented candidates than would be predicted solely by individualistic rational behavior.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/2111565

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 217

Metadata

Authors
Morton, R. B.
Venue
American Journal of Political Science
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1991-08
Volume
35
Issue
3
Pages
758
ISSN
0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2022562660
Cited by
217
References
0
FWCI
4.92
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Groups in Rational Turnout Models. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2111565
The paper
Morton, R. B. (1991). Groups in Rational Turnout Models. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111565

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.