The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
Open accessAbstract
Access to private information is shown to generate both the incentives and the ability to manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements. The fact that privileged information is noisy interferes with the public's attempts to learn whether such announcements are honest; it allows opportunistic individuals to manipulate prices repeatedly, without ever being fully found out. This leads us to extend Sobel's [1985] model of strategic communication to the case of noisy private signals. Our results show that when truthfulness is not easily verifiable, restrictions on trading by insiders may be needed to preserve the integrity of information embodied in prices.
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Citations
Cites
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Kyle, A. S. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913210 · Cited by 9,580
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Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
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Stiglitz, J. E., & Grossman, S. J. (1980) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8765r99 · Cited by 3,645
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Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 · Cited by 3,087
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Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-x · Cited by 1,846
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Cukierman, A., & Meltzer, A. H. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912324 · Cited by 1,286
Discounted Dynamic Programming
Blackwell, D. (1965) · The Annals of Mathematical Statistics · doi:10.1214/aoms/1177700285 · Cited by 918
Discrete Parameter Martingales
(2006) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-0-387-35434-7_14 · Cited by 682
Sobel, J. (1985) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297732 · Cited by 543
Insider Trading and the Stock Market
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Public Policy and the Corporation
Levin, S. L., & King, M. A. (1980) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1057179 · Cited by 371
A monopolistic market for information
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The Effect of Regulation Changes on Insider Trading
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BOLTON, P., FREIXAS, X., & SHAPIRO, J. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01708.x · Cited by 940
Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice
Dranove, D., & Jin, G. Z. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.4.935 · Cited by 740
Trade Generation, Reputation, and Sell‐Side Analysts
JACKSON, A. R. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00743.x · Cited by 714
How did increased competition affect credit ratings?
Becker, B., & Milbourn, T. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.012 · Cited by 676
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (1992) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/5.3.503 · Cited by 621
Metadata
- Authors
- Benabou, R., & Laroque, G.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1992-08-01
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 921-958
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W1528656328
- Cited by
- 565
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 4.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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