The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results
Abstract
This paper assesses whether affirmative action programs and equal opportunity laws affect the output of economic agents. More precisely, we find that equal opportunity laws and affirmative action programs always benefit disadvantaged groups. Equal opportunity laws also increase the effort levels of all subjects and hence the profits of the tournament administrator (usually the firm). The effects of affirmative action programs depend on the severity of a group's cost disadvantage. When the cost disadvantage is severe, these programs significantly increase effort levels (and hence profits). The opposite is true when the disadvantage is slight.
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Cites
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1979) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0401 · Cited by 3,033
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
Green, J. R., & Stokey, N. L. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261153 · Cited by 983
Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition
Stiglitz, J. E., & Nalebuff, B. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.7916/d87h1v6s · Cited by 975
Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes
O'Keeffe, M., Viscusi, W. K., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (1984) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298022 · Cited by 391
Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions
Harrison, G. W. (1987) · American Economic Review · Cited by 284
Does the Contract Compliance Program Work? An Analysis of Chicago Data
Heckman, J. J., & Wolpin, K. I. (1976) · Industrial and Labor Relations Review · doi:10.1177/001979397602900402 · Cited by 87
Reactions to discrimination in an incentive pay compensation scheme: A game-theoretic approach
Weigelt, K., Dukerich, J. M., & Schotter, A. (1989) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/0749-5978(89)90033-2 · Cited by 58
Self-citationAffirmative Action and Opportunity: A Study of Female Quit Rates
Osterman, P. (1982) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1923945 · Cited by 30
Tournaments, Piece Rates, and the Shape of the Payoff Function
Drago, R., & Heywood, J. S. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261639 · Cited by 28
Cited by
Performance in competitive environments: gender differences
Gneezy, U., Niederle, M., & Rustichini, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360698496 · Cited by 1,997
Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender
Dohmen, T., & Falk, A. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.2.556 · Cited by 739
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
Holzer, H., & Neumark, D. (2000) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.38.3.483 · Cited by 443
CEO decision horizon and firm performance: An empirical investigation
Antia, M., Pantzalis, C., & Park, J. C. (2010) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.01.005 · Cited by 319
Metadata
- Authors
- Schotter, A., & Weigelt, K.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1992-05-01
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 511-539
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2064086867
- Cited by
- 341
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 8.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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