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Communication in Coordination Games

Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R., Ross, T. W.·1992·The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Abstract

We present experimental evidence on nonbinding, preplay communication in bilateral coordination games. To evaluate the effect of "cheap talk, " we consider two communication structures (one-way and two-way communication) and two types of coordination games (one with a cooperative strategy and a second in which one strategy is less "risky"). In games with a cooperative strategy, one-way communication increases play of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium relative to the no communication baseline; two-way communication does not always decrease the frequency of coordination failures. In the second type of game, two-way communication always leads to the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, while one-way communication does not.

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Metadata

Authors
Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R., & Ross, T. W.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
1992-05-01
Volume
107
Issue
2
Pages
739-771
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
OpenAlex
W2019530299
Cited by
687
References
0
FWCI
17.79
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Communication in Coordination Games. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2118488
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Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R., & Ross, T. W. (1992). Communication in Coordination Games. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118488

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