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Communication in Coordination Games
Abstract
We present experimental evidence on nonbinding, preplay communication in bilateral coordination games. To evaluate the effect of "cheap talk, " we consider two communication structures (one-way and two-way communication) and two types of coordination games (one with a cooperative strategy and a second in which one strategy is less "risky"). In games with a cooperative strategy, one-way communication increases play of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium relative to the no communication baseline; two-way communication does not always decrease the frequency of coordination failures. In the second type of game, two-way communication always leads to the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, while one-way communication does not.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R., & Ross, T. W.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1992-05-01
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 739-771
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2019530299
- Cited by
- 687
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 17.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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