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Are There Any Natural Rights?
Abstract
There is of course no simple identification to be made between moral and legal rights, but there is an intimate connection between the two, and this itself is one feature which distinguishes a moral right from other fundamental moral concepts. The words droit, diritto, and Recht, used by continental jurists, have no simple English translation and seem to English jurists to hover uncertainly between law and morals, but they do in fact mark off an area of morality which has special characteristics. In contrast with special rights, which constitute a justification peculiar to the holder of the right for interfering with another's freedom, are general rights, which are asserted defensively, when some unjustified interference is anticipated or threatened, in order to point out that the interference is unjustified. The assertion of general rights directly invokes the principle that all men equally have the right to be free; the assertion of a special right invokes it indirectly.
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Citations
Cited by
Elements of a Theory of Human Rights
SEN, A. (2004) · Philosophy & Public Affairs · doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2004.00017.x · Cited by 1,081
Waldron, J. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199915439.001.0001 · Cited by 687
The Political Philosophy of Needs
Hamilton, L. A. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487415 · Cited by 477
Shared intention and personal intentions
Gilbert, M. (2009) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9372-z · Cited by 335
Two Approaches to Shared Intention: An Essay in the Philosophy of Social Phenomena
Gilbert, M. (2008) · Analyse & Kritik · doi:10.1515/auk-2008-0208 · Cited by 54
Metadata
- Authors
- Hart, H. L. A.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1955-04
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 175
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2326580376
- Cited by
- 1,935
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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