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Belief, Truth and Knowledge.

Klein, Peter D., Armstrong, D. M.·1976·The Philosophical Review

Abstract

Part I. Belief: 1. The nature of belief 2. Beliefs as states 3. Belief and language 4. Propositions 5. Concepts and Ideas 6. General beliefs 7. Existential beliefs 8. Further considerations about belief Part II. Truth: 9. Truth Part III: Knowledge. 10. Knowledge entails true belief 11. The infinite regress of reasons 12. Non -inferential knowledge (1) 13. Non-inferential knowledge (2) 14. Inferential and general knowledge 15. Further considerations about knowledge Conclusion Works Referred to Index.

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Metadata

Authors
Klein, P. D., & Armstrong, D. M.
Venue
The Philosophical Review
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1976-04
Volume
85
Issue
2
Pages
225
ISSN
0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2167600184
Cited by
467
References
0
FWCI
46.17
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Belief, Truth and Knowledge. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2183733
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Klein, P. D., & Armstrong, D. M. (1976). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. The Philosophical Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183733

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.