The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What is a Law of Nature?
Abstract
This is a study of a crucial and controversial topic in metaphysics and the philosophy of science: the status of the laws of nature. D. M. Armstrong works out clearly and in comprehensive detail a largely original view that laws are relations between properties or universals. The theory is continuous with the views on universals and more generally with the scientific realism that Professor Armstrong has advanced in earlier publications. He begins here by mounting an attack on the orthodox and sceptical view deriving from Hume that laws assert no more than a regularity of coincidence between instances of properties. In doing so he presents what may become the definitive statement of the case against this position. Professor Armstrong then goes on to establish his own theory in a systematic manner defending it against the most likely objections, and extending both it and the related theory of universals to cover functional and statistical laws. This treatment of the subject is refreshingly concise and vivid: it will both stimulate vigorous professional debate and make an excellent student text.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Many see this as a problem for the view.”
From Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature (2022) · cites this paper as Armstrong, 1983, p.40
In the citing paper
“However, it is really the necessitation relation N that does the explanatory work in Armstrong's theory.”
From Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature (2022) · cites this paper as Armstrong, 1983
In the citing paper
“It is crucial that the state of affairs N (F, G) is understood as a universal.”
From Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature (2022) · cites this paper as Armstrong, 1983
In the citing paper
“it has been argued: that dispositionalists and natural kind essentialists struggle to explain conservation laws; 23 that dispositionalists struggle to explain retention laws (namely, the regularity that things are disposed to retain their dispositions over time in the absence of interferences); 24 and that all property-based accounts struggle to explain functional laws, 25 idealized laws, 26 and”
From The nomological argument for the existence of God (2022) · cites this paper as Armstrong (1983: Chapter 7)
Citations
Cites
A treatise of human nature (1739-40)
Hume, D. (1996) · The Sublime · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511620409.040 · Cited by 9,842
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
Hutchison, T. W., & Popper, K. R. (1959) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550489 · Cited by 7,499
Tractatus logico-philosophicus
(2021) · Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · doi:10.2307/j.ctv22d4t7n.8 · Cited by 4,869
Madden, E. H., Goodman, N., & Melsen, A. G. V. (1955) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2103789 · Cited by 4,377
Aspects of Scientific Explanation.
Resnik, M. D., & Hempel, C. G. (1966) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2106169 · Cited by 3,319
Demopoulos, W., & van Fraassen, B. C. (1982) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184804 · Cited by 3,311
Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)
Fodor, J. A. (1974) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00485230 · Cited by 1,815
An Inquiry concerning human understanding
Hume, D. (1955) · Cited by 1,775
Introduction to Logical Theory.
Leblanc, H., & Strawson, P. E. (1953) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2103339 · Cited by 1,463
Whitehead, A. N. (1933) · Jagiellonian Digital Library (Jagiellonian University) · Cited by 1,201
Cited by
Armstrong, D. M. (1997) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511583308 · Cited by 2,022
Self-citationArmstrong, D. M. (1996) · Nijhoff International Philosophy Series · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-8733-4_5 · Cited by 1,971
Self-citationFour-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time
Sider, T. (2001) · doi:10.1093/019924443x.001.0001 · Cited by 1,907
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1989) · doi:10.1093/0198248601.001.0001 · Cited by 1,821
A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable
Chakravartty, A. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487354 · Cited by 961
Metadata
- Authors
- Armstrong, D. M.
- Affiliations
- The University of Sydney (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Armstrong, D. M.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1983-11-17
- OpenAlex
- W1979082215
- Cited by
- 1,415
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 40 · 2025: 93 · 2024: 49 · 2023: 34 · 2022: 41 · 2021: 50 · 2020: 60 · 2019: 98 · 2018: 36 · 2017: 33 · 2016: 47 · 2015: 37 · 2014: 43 · 2013: 49 · 2012: 33
- FWCI
- 12.71
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- laws of nature, metaphysics of law, regularity theory, David Lewis, David M. Armstrong, philosophy of science, metaphysics
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: What is a Law of Nature? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9781139171700
- The paper
- Armstrong, D. M. (1983). What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139171700
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.