Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I will argue in this paper that our knowledge about pain and pleasure creates an epistemic problem for theists. The problem is not that some proposition about pain and pleasure can be shown to be both true and logically inconsistent with theism. Rather, the problem is evidential. A statement reporting the observations and testimony upon which our knowledge about pain and pleasure is based bears a certain significant negative evidential relation to theism.' And because of this, we have a prima facie good epistemic reason to reject theism-that is, a reason that is sufficient for rejecting theism unless overridden by other reasons for not rejecting theism.
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“It is saying that evil that is not ultimately for the greater good provides us with evidence against God's existence.”
From Cosmopsychism and the Problem of Evil (2024) · cites this paper as Draper (1989)
Citations
Cites
Dialogues concerning Natural Religion
Hume, D. (1779) · David Hume: The Natural History of Religion and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion · doi:10.1093/oseo/instance.00044084 · Cited by 1,233
Swinburne, R. (2004) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271672.001.0001 · Cited by 916
Swinburne, R. (1991) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1093/0198239637.001.0001 · Cited by 911
Hick, J. (2010) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230283961 · Cited by 437
Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil
Adams, R. M. (1977) · American Philosophical Quarterly · Cited by 304
The humean obstacle to evidential arguments from suffering: On avoiding the evils of ?appearance?
Wykstra, S. J. (1984) · International Journal for Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1007/bf00136567 · Cited by 262
Sircello, G. (2015) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400872381 · Cited by 89
The probabilistic argument from evil
Plantinga, A. (1979) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00354802 · Cited by 63
Plantinga on the Problem of Evil
Adams, R. M. (1985) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-5223-2_7 · Cited by 39
Meyers, R. G., Madden, E. H., & Hare, P. H. (1969) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2105547 · Cited by 30
Cited by
Ockham's Razors: A User's Manual
Sober, E. (2015) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107705937 · Cited by 356
Evidence and evolution: the logic behind the science
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-2076 · Cited by 230
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion
Swinburne, R. (2015) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722335.001.0001 · Cited by 109
Sober, E. (2005) · The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1002/9780470756638.ch6 · Cited by 104
Divine Holiness and Divine Action
Murphy, M. C. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198864783.001.0001 · Cited by 107
Metadata
- Authors
- Draper, P.
- Corresponding author
- Draper, Paul
- ORCID
- Draper, Paul
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1989-06
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 331
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2329086096
- Cited by
- 291
- References
- 12
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 33 · 2019: 68 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 6.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Noûs (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Theology and Philosophy of Evil
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Study and Philosophy of Religion
- Keywords
- pain, pleasure, theism, negative evidence, epistemic reasons, epistemology of religion
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2215486
- The paper
- Draper, P. (1989). Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists. Noûs. https://doi.org/10.2307/2215486
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.