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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 12 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Cosmopsychism and the Problem of Evil

Open access
Cawdron, Harvey · 2024 · Sophia

Abstract

Abstract Cosmopsychism, the idea that the universe is conscious, is experiencing something of a revival as an explanation of consciousness in philosophy of mind and is also making inroads into philosophy of religion. In the latter field, it has been used to formulate models of certain forms of theism, such as pantheism and panentheism, and has also been proposed as a rival to the classical theism of the Abrahamic faiths. It has been claimed by Philip Goff that a certain form of cosmopsychism, namely agentive cosmopsychism, poses a threat to classical theism because it can explain features of the universe like fine-tuning without having to deal with the problem of evil. This is because, unlike the classical theist, the cosmopsychist can deny at least one of the divine attributes motivating the problem of evil, namely omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. In this paper, I shall consider which of the divine attributes the cosmopsychist should focus on when responding to the problem of evil and shall conclude that the rejection of omnibenevolence is the most satisfactory option.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper argues that agentive cosmopsychism can explain fine-tuning while avoiding the problem of evil, and that the most satisfactory way to do so is to deny the cosmic subject’s omnibenevolence. It assesses responses focused on omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence, concluding that rejecting omnibenevolence is preferable.

Key findings

  • Denying omnibenevolence is the most satisfactory option: evil is neither inconsistent with nor evidence against the cosmic subject, and fine-tuning can still be explained.
  • Denying omniscience is unsatisfactory: Shani’s model of concealed experiences does not fully account for evil because outward evil and suffering remain detectable, and complete unawareness would undermine the cosmopsychist’s ability to explain fine-tuning.
  • Denying omnipotence is also unsatisfactory: Goff’s model still faces the problem of evil because the cosmic subject fine-tunes the laws constraining it and knows future consequences, so gratuitous evil seems possible; a lack of control over other minds explains moral evil but not natural evil.
  • Mathews’s constitutive model faces transparency and coherence problems, and the cosmic subject would not fully capture the intensity and all-consuming nature of extreme suffering.

Methods

  • Philosophical conceptual analysis; no empirical data, sample, or quantitative results are reported.
  • The paper examines agentive cosmopsychism, constitutive versus non-constitutive models, fine-tuning, the logical and evidential problems of evil, and moral versus natural evil.
  • It engages primarily with proposals by Goff, Mathews, and Shani, along with critiques such as Albahari’s, to assess which divine attribute the cosmopsychist should deny.

Limitations

  • The paper states that it is not an exhaustive survey and that future agentive cosmopsychist models might vindicate explanations involving omniscience or omnipotence.
  • The paper states that further questions about a non-omnibenevolent cosmic mind—such as whether evil is a brute fact, whether evil can be triumphed over, and whether the ultimate ground of being can be limited—are left for future work.
  • Evident from the text: the argument relies on conceptual analysis, conceivability, and interpretations of others’ models rather than empirical evidence.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s11841-023-00965-0

Cites

56 of 56 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

2 Valid · 2 Not valid · 8 Not checked · 52 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Show all 53 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Gerson, L. P. (1993). Plotinus’s Metaphysics: Emanation or Creation? The Review of Metaphysics, 46(3), 559–574.
  2. Inwagen, V. (2006). Peter. Oxford University Press.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Cawdron, H.
Affiliations
University of St Andrews (GB)
Corresponding author
Cawdron, Harvey
Venue
Sophia
Published
2023-06-24
Volume
63
Issue
1
Pages
151-167
ISSN
  • 0038-1527 (ISSN-L)
  • 1873-930X
OpenAlex
W4381995930
Cited by
8
References
53
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3
FWCI
13.77
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Sophia (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • St Andrews Research Repository (St Andrews Research Repository) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Theology and Philosophy of Evil
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Study and Philosophy of Religion
Keywords
cosmopsychism, problem of evil, classical theism, divine omniscience, divine omnipotence, pantheism, panentheism, fine-tuning, divine attributes

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Cosmopsychism and the Problem of Evil. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11841-023-00965-0
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Cawdron, H. (2024). Cosmopsychism and the Problem of Evil. Sophia. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-023-00965-0

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.