The DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 12 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Cosmopsychism and the Problem of Evil
Open accessAbstract
Abstract Cosmopsychism, the idea that the universe is conscious, is experiencing something of a revival as an explanation of consciousness in philosophy of mind and is also making inroads into philosophy of religion. In the latter field, it has been used to formulate models of certain forms of theism, such as pantheism and panentheism, and has also been proposed as a rival to the classical theism of the Abrahamic faiths. It has been claimed by Philip Goff that a certain form of cosmopsychism, namely agentive cosmopsychism, poses a threat to classical theism because it can explain features of the universe like fine-tuning without having to deal with the problem of evil. This is because, unlike the classical theist, the cosmopsychist can deny at least one of the divine attributes motivating the problem of evil, namely omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. In this paper, I shall consider which of the divine attributes the cosmopsychist should focus on when responding to the problem of evil and shall conclude that the rejection of omnibenevolence is the most satisfactory option.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper argues that agentive cosmopsychism can explain fine-tuning while avoiding the problem of evil, and that the most satisfactory way to do so is to deny the cosmic subject’s omnibenevolence. It assesses responses focused on omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence, concluding that rejecting omnibenevolence is preferable.
Key findings
- Denying omnibenevolence is the most satisfactory option: evil is neither inconsistent with nor evidence against the cosmic subject, and fine-tuning can still be explained.
- Denying omniscience is unsatisfactory: Shani’s model of concealed experiences does not fully account for evil because outward evil and suffering remain detectable, and complete unawareness would undermine the cosmopsychist’s ability to explain fine-tuning.
- Denying omnipotence is also unsatisfactory: Goff’s model still faces the problem of evil because the cosmic subject fine-tunes the laws constraining it and knows future consequences, so gratuitous evil seems possible; a lack of control over other minds explains moral evil but not natural evil.
- Mathews’s constitutive model faces transparency and coherence problems, and the cosmic subject would not fully capture the intensity and all-consuming nature of extreme suffering.
Methods
- Philosophical conceptual analysis; no empirical data, sample, or quantitative results are reported.
- The paper examines agentive cosmopsychism, constitutive versus non-constitutive models, fine-tuning, the logical and evidential problems of evil, and moral versus natural evil.
- It engages primarily with proposals by Goff, Mathews, and Shani, along with critiques such as Albahari’s, to assess which divine attribute the cosmopsychist should deny.
Limitations
- The paper states that it is not an exhaustive survey and that future agentive cosmopsychist models might vindicate explanations involving omniscience or omnipotence.
- The paper states that further questions about a non-omnibenevolent cosmic mind—such as whether evil is a brute fact, whether evil can be triumphed over, and whether the ultimate ground of being can be limited—are left for future work.
- Evident from the text: the argument relies on conceptual analysis, conceivability, and interpretations of others’ models rather than empirical evidence.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
2 Valid · 2 Not valid · 8 Not checked · 52 Own results and interpretations
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A non-constitutive understanding is thus suitable to use when formulating an agentive cosmopsychist position.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It seems to be able to explain features of the universe like fine-tuning, things that classical theism is often invoked to explain, without suffering from some of classical theism's key drawbacks.”
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Nonetheless, this paper shows that the agentive cosmopsychist has a plausible way forward in this debate with the rejection of omnibenevolence.”
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This discussion has shown that one can produce a model of agentive cosmopsychism capable of explaining fine-tuning whilst avoiding the problem of evil”
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on 2 assumptions not shown here.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The denial of omnibenevolence entails that this model can avoid the problem of evil altogether.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
22 more claims
Create a free account to see all 64 claims and to verify the 1 reference still open.
- It may state two separate claims as one. 17
- Probably not a substantial claim. 25
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
Citations
Cites
Journal of Consciousness Studies
(2022) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201 · Cited by 6,832
American Philosophical Quarterly
(2023) · American Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.5406/21521123.60.4.09 · Cited by 3,225
Monism: The Priority of the Whole
Schaffer, J. (2010) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2009-025 · Cited by 925 · cited 14×
“Moreover, Goff also claims that his model, in which the cosmic subject is limited in its power, is simpler than a cosmic subject that has irrational desires or a flawed capacity to recognise and respond to 51 See Gerson (1993) for an outline of this.”
InfluentialSwinburne, R. (2004) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271672.001.0001 · Cited by 916
Swinburne, R. (1991) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1093/0198239637.001.0001 · Cited by 911
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality
Goff, P. (2017) · Oxford Scholarship Online · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190677015.001.0001 · Cited by 657
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind · doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 · Cited by 574
MACKIE, J. L. (1955) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/lxiv.254.200 · Cited by 476
Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism
Chalmers, D. J. (2016) · Panpsychism · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0002 · Cited by 432
Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil
Adams, R. M. (1977) · American Philosophical Quarterly · Cited by 304
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Gerson, L. P. (1993). Plotinus’s Metaphysics: Emanation or Creation? The Review of Metaphysics, 46(3), 559–574.
- Inwagen, V. (2006). Peter. Oxford University Press.
Cited by
The regeneration of the cosmic mind: cosmopsychism, mental chaos, and the new creation
Cawdron, H. (2024) · Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1017/s0034412524000106 · Cited by 1
Self-citationThe Fall of the Cosmic Mind: Cosmopsychism, the Satan Hypothesis, and Natural Evil
Cawdron, H. (2024) · Toronto Journal of Theology · doi:10.3138/tjt-2024-0012 · Cited by 5
Self-citationOmnisubjectivity and Divine Knowledge
Cawdron, H. (2026) · Palgrave frontiers in philosophy of religion · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-31669-1_5
Self-citationCawdron, H. (2026) · Palgrave frontiers in philosophy of religion · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-31669-1_2
Self-citationGītā-Inspired Panentheistic Cosmopsychism and Atheist Cosmopsychism
de Oliveira, G. O. (2026) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-026-00966-6
Metadata
- Authors
- Cawdron, H.
- Affiliations
- University of St Andrews (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Cawdron, Harvey
- ORCID
- Cawdron, Harvey
- Venue
- Sophia
- Published
- 2023-06-24
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 151-167
- ISSN
- 0038-1527 (ISSN-L)
- 1873-930X
- OpenAlex
- W4381995930
- Cited by
- 8
- References
- 53
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3
- FWCI
- 13.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- dx.doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Sophia (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- St Andrews Research Repository (St Andrews Research Repository) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Theology and Philosophy of Evil
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Study and Philosophy of Religion
- Keywords
- cosmopsychism, problem of evil, classical theism, divine omniscience, divine omnipotence, pantheism, panentheism, fine-tuning, divine attributes
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-10, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-10 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Cosmopsychism and the Problem of Evil. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11841-023-00965-0
- The paper
- Cawdron, H. (2024). Cosmopsychism and the Problem of Evil. Sophia. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-023-00965-0
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.