The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 216 of the 230 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 24 of the 170 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
This article examines the economics of financing small business in private equity and debt markets. Firms are viewed through a financial growth cycle paradigm in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle. We show the sources of small business finance, and how capital structure varies with firm size and age. The interconnectedness of small firm finance is discussed along with the impact of the macroeconomic environment. We also analyze a number of research and policy issues, review the literature, and suggest topics for future research.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This article reviews the economics of small business finance through a financial growth cycle paradigm, emphasizing informational opacity and the roles of private equity and debt markets. It documents US small business funding sources and contracts, and analyzes vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks, credit crunches, and bank consolidation.
Key findings
- US small business finance is split roughly evenly between equity (49.63%) and debt (50.37%); the largest sources are the principal owner, commercial banks, and trade creditors, together accounting for 70.10% of total funding. Commercial banks provide 18.75%, trade credit 15.78%, principal owner equity 31.33%, angel finance 3.59%, venture capital 1.85%, and credit card debt 0.14%.
- Financial institution debt is used by 54.23% of small businesses; 86.95% name a commercial bank as their primary financial institution. Average relationship length is 6.64 years overall and 9.01 years with the primary institution; 52.03% of financial institution debt is under lines of credit, 91.94% is secured, and 51.63% is guaranteed.
- The growth cycle paradigm predicts younger/more opaque firms rely on insider finance, trade credit, and angel finance, then venture capital and banks, and eventually public markets. However, 1993 NSSBF data show insider finance does not dominate external finance even for adolescents (upper bound 56.8% insider, roughly equal to external), and financial institution debt is important to very young firms, often based on personal guarantees or collateral.
- Macro vulnerability: the early-1990s credit crunch saw real C&I loans fall 23.2% ($596.7 billion to $458.2 billion) and estimated small business lending fall 38.5% ($143.7 billion to $88.4 billion). Banks with less than $100 million in assets held about 9% of portfolios in small business loans versus about 2% for banks over $10 billion; large banks charged about 100 basis points less and required collateral about 25% less often than small banks, other things equal.
Methods
- Design: review and synthesis organized around the financial growth cycle paradigm, covering theoretical and empirical literature on private equity and debt markets, contracts, and macroeconomic vulnerability.
- Data: primarily the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF) for US small business finance tables, plus other sources including NFIB, SCF, STBL, CALL, CRA, Venture Economics/VentureOne, and international data.
- Analysis: descriptive tabulations (Tables 1 and 2) and literature synthesis; the paper is a review rather than a new primary empirical study.
Limitations
- Paper-stated: Table 1 data are not completely accurate or consistent and should be considered rough estimates; angel finance estimates are imprecise (range $15 billion to $120 billion); 1993 data may not reflect current conditions; weighted averages mask considerable heterogeneity.
- Paper-stated: the growth cycle paradigm is not intended to fit all small businesses; firm size, age, and information availability are far from perfectly correlated, and the points at which different funding sources begin and end are not definitive.
- Evident from the text: informational opacity and the intertwining of personal and business finances make small business finance difficult to research, and data on owners’ finances are often unavailable; the paper relies heavily on existing literature and available data rather than new primary data collection.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
22 Valid · 27 Not valid · 107 Not checked · 201 Own results and interpretations
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“This use of personal assets to help with external ®nance also highlights another important aspect of small business ®nance ± the ®nancial intertwining of owners and their businesses (Ang, 1992).”
§ The economics of small business ®nance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the ®nancial growth cycle > 2.3. The ®nancial growth cycle of small business
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Ang, 1992 source
In “Integrating Personal and Business Accounts,” Ang says that personal guarantees or collateral make business risk inseparable from owners’ personal risk. “The Financing Decision” also identifies owners’ assets used for loan guarantees as contributions to the business. Together, these passages support the cited point that using personal assets to obtain external finance intertwines owners’ and businesses’ finances. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Costly state veri®cation (Townsend, 1979;Diamond, 1984) and adverse selection (Myers, 1984;Myers and Majluf, 1984;Nachman and Noe, 1994) arguments suggest the optimality of debt contracts after insider ®nance has been exhausted.”
§ The economics of small business ®nance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the ®nancial growth cycle > 2.3. The ®nancial growth cycle of small business
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Townsend, 1979 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 3 characterizes an optimal contract for a firm financing an investment project as a bond that defaults when returns fall below a threshold, supporting the costly-state-verification rationale for debt. The paper does not establish that debt becomes optimal only after insider finance has been exhausted. The adverse-selection citations in the sentence refer to other sources, not Townsend. (LLM, conf=0.85)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Diamond, 1984 source
- Not matchedcites Myers, 1984
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“An agency problem arises in the relationship between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist in which the entrepreneur may expend insucient eort, exhibit expense preference behavior, or lack sucient information or skill to make optimal production decisions.”
§ The economics of small business ®nance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the ®nancial growth cycle > 3.2. The venture capital market
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Cooper and Carleton, 1979 source
- Partly supportedcites Bergemann and Hege, 1998 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 2.3, “Moral hazard and financing,” describes an entrepreneur who may reduce costly effort or divert investment funds to private ends, supporting the insufficient-effort and expense-preference parts of the claim. It does not identify a lack of the entrepreneur’s information or skill as a cause of poor production decisions; it instead says the entrepreneur and venture capitalists initially have the same assessment of the project. (LLM, conf=0.88)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Since 1990, this share has about doubled to 30% (Fenn et al., 1997).”
§ The economics of small business ®nance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the ®nancial growth cycle > 3. The role of private equity markets in small business ®nance
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Fenn et al., 1997 source
In “IPO Firms that Received Private Equity Backing,” the paper states that the share of IPOs with venture backing averaged 15% during the 1980s and doubled to 30% since 1990. This directly supports the cited claim. (LLM, conf=0.95)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“During the 1980s, approximately 15% of all IPOs were backed by venture capital, well out of proportion to the fraction of all ®rms that received venture capital.”
§ The economics of small business ®nance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the ®nancial growth cycle > 3. The role of private equity markets in small business ®nance
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Fenn et al., 1997 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The section “IPO Firms that Received Private Equity Backing” states that venture-backed IPOs averaged 15% of IPOs during the 1980s. It does not give the fraction of all firms that received venture capital or make the claimed comparison with that fraction. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
184 more claims · 6 with their cited sources checked
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“SMEs are more dependent on external financing supplied by commercial banks (Berger and Udell 1998) because most of them are not qualified to raise money from the stock market.”
From Local Bank, Digital Financial Inclusion and SME Financing Constraints: Empirical Evidence from China (2022) · cites this paper as Berger and Udell 1998
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
“Non®nancial business/government debt provides 19.26% of small business funding (mostly trade credit)”
§ The economics of small business ®nance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the ®nancial growth cycle > 4. The role of private debt markets in small business ®nance
Reported 19.26 · recomputed 18.01
Citations
Cites
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment
Miller, M. H. (1958) · American Economic Review · Cited by 14,574
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Myers, S. C. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90015-0 · Cited by 13,169
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769 · cited 1×
“…pledging outside collateral may help resolve adverse selection problems when the borrower has more information about the quality of the investment than the lender, and may help prevent credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, 1986, Bester 1985, Chan and Kanatas 1985, Besanko and Thakor 1987a,b).”
The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment
Terra, P. R. (2008) · Revista de Administração e Contabilidade da Unisinos · doi:10.4013/base.20082.07 · Cited by 8,615
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476 · cited 2×
“Costly state verification (Townsend 1979, Diamond 1984) and adverse selection (Myers 1984, Myers and Majluf 1984, Nachman and Noe 1994) arguments suggest the optimality of debt contracts after insider cFor example, there are generally accepted definitions of the stages of finance for the kind of…”
Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have
Myers, S., & Majluf, N. (1984) · doi:10.3386/w1396 · Cited by 6,745
The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data
PETERSEN, M. A., & RAJAN, R. G. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04418.x · Cited by 5,440 · cited 4×
“…whereas mortgages, equipment loans, motor vehicle loans, and other loans may more often be transactionsdriven .zs It was also found that dependence on trade credit decreased with the length of the banking relationship, supporting the value of relationship lending (Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995).”
InfluentialInside the black box: the credit channel of monetary policy transmission
Bernanke, B. S., & Gertler, M. (1995) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.9.4.27 · Cited by 4,211
Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's‐Length Debt
RAJAN, R. G. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04662.x · Cited by 3,902 · cited 1×
“Some research suggests that these firms may try to reduce the control of their banks by issuing public debt, even though public debt may entail higher costs (Diamond 1991, 1993, Rajan 1992, Houston and James 1996).”
Research works printed but not linked: 9
- Cook, L., 1997. Trade finance, bank finance, and capital market imperfections. Working paper. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
- Freear, 1994, The private investor market for venture capital, The Financier, 1, 7
- Hancock, 1997, Bank capital, nonbank finance, and real estate activity, Journal of Housing Research, 8, 75
- Hempel, G., Coleman, A., Simonson, D., 1986. Bank Management, Wiley, New York
- Ho, R., 1997. Credit-card use to finance small business is soaring, says survey of small firms. Wall Street Journal B2, Sept. 25
- Morsman Jr., E., 1986. Commercial loan structuring. Journal of Commercial Bank Lending 68, 2–20
- Ravid, 1996, Debt maturity – A survey, Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, 5, 1
- Wetzel Jr. W.E., 1994. Venture capital. In: Bygrave, W.D. (Ed.), Portable MBA in Entrepreneurship. Wiley, New York, pp. 172–194
- White, L.J., 1995. An analytical framework. In: Zahid, S.N. (Ed.), Financial Sector Development in Asia. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 3–35
Cited by
Small and medium-size enterprises: Access to finance as a growth constraint
Beck, T., & Demirguc-Kunt, A. (2006) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.05.009 · Cited by 2,607
“There are mixed results concerning the effect of bank concentration and competitiveness on the availability of SME financing (Berger et al., 2004).”
ResultBerger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (2002) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00682 · Cited by 1,882
“data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance (adapted from Berger and Udell, 1998,”
InfluentialSelf-citationBerger, A. N., Miller, N. H., Petersen, M. A., Rajan, R. G., & Stein, J. C. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.003 · Cited by 1,888
Self-citationBack to the Beginning: Persistence and the Cross‐Section of Corporate Capital Structure
LEMMON, M. L., ROBERTS, M. R., & ZENDER, J. F. (2008) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01369.x · Cited by 1,844
Berger, A. N., Demsetz, R. S., & Strahan, P. E. (1999) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00125-3 · Cited by 1,477
“For a general review of small business finance, see Berger and Udell (1998).”
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- N. Berger, A., & F. Udell, G.
- Venue
- Journal of Banking & Finance
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1998-08
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 6-8
- Pages
- 613-673
- ISSN
- 0378-4266 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2119780569
- Cited by
- 3,690
- References
- 230
- Citations by year
- 2026: 136 · 2025: 148 · 2024: 144 · 2023: 193 · 2022: 155 · 2021: 211 · 2020: 200 · 2019: 156 · 2018: 208 · 2017: 174 · 2016: 186 · 2015: 187 · 2014: 168 · 2013: 177 · 2012: 171
- FWCI
- 169.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-nd
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- www.elsevier.com/legal/tdmrep-license (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ (vor, 125 d)
- Locations
- Journal of Banking & Finance (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- York University
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Private Equity and Venture Capital
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
- Keywords
- small business financing, private equity, debt markets, capital structure, firm size, firm age, macroeconomic conditions
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- N. Berger, A., & F. Udell, G. (1998). The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle. Journal of Banking & Finance. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00038-7
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