The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders
Abstract
The symmetric equilibrium of third-price auctions is characterized. It makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second-price auctions: bids exceed private values, the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one, increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids, and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral Nash equilibrium. In the experiment, bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory. However, the game theoretic models correctly anticipate, at least directionally, the important effects of the price rule changes. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society.
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Citations
Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Myerson, R. B. (1981) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.6.1.58 · Cited by 5,920
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
Kagel, J. H., Harstad, R. M., & Levin, D. (2009) · Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse · doi:10.1515/9781400830138.177 · Cited by 458
Self-citationTheory and Behavior of Single Object Auctions
Cox, J. C., & Roberson, B. (1991) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528354.031 · Cited by 395
A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis
Dyer, D., Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (1989) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234207 · Cited by 235
Self-citation
Cited by
7. Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research
Kagel, J. H. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-009 · Cited by 785
Self-citationGroup size and the voluntary provision of public goods
Isaac, R. M., Walker, J. M., & Williams, A. W. (1994) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(94)90068-x · Cited by 735
Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet
Lucking-Reiley, D. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.5.1063 · Cited by 446
Miller, K. M., Hofstetter, R., Krohmer, H., & Zhang, Z. J. (2011) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmkr.48.1.172 · Cited by 441
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Li, S. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20160425 · Cited by 439
Metadata
- Authors
- Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1993-07
- Volume
- 103
- Issue
- 419
- Pages
- 868
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2096423350
- Cited by
- 474
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 2.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (1993). Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2307/2234706
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