The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Focal Points
Abstract
The paper presents a theoretical framework which distinguishes between the strategic structure of a game (the `existential game') and the way the players describe the game to themselves. Each player works with a private description of the game, in which strategies are identified by labels; labels are generated by a stochastic labelling procedure. Each player chooses a decision rule which, for each possible private description, picks one of the available strategy labels. A criterion of collective rationality is applied to choices among decision rules. The implications of collective rationality are explored for a range of games with different labelling procedures.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationThe Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games
Mehta, J., Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1994) · American Economic Review · Cited by 447
Self-citationLearning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
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The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
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Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
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Self-citationRationality, coordination, and convention
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Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis
Aoki, M. (2002) · Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics · doi:10.1628/0932456022975150 · Cited by 1,200
IDENTIFYING SOCIAL NORMS USING COORDINATION GAMES: WHY DOES DICTATOR GAME SHARING VARY?
Krupka, E. L., & Weber, R. A. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12006 · Cited by 995
The Two Facets of Collaboration: Cooperation and Coordination in Strategic Alliances
Gulati, R., Wohlgezogen, F., & Zhelyazkov, P. (2012) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/19416520.2012.691646 · Cited by 768
The power and politics of blogs
Farrell, H., & Drezner, D. W. (2007) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-007-9198-1 · Cited by 572
Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching
(2013) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta10637 · Cited by 371
Metadata
- Authors
- Sugden, R.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1995-05
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 430
- Pages
- 533
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2038327354
- Cited by
- 409
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 10.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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